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The Judicial Power and Treaty 
Delegation 
Michael P. Van Alstinet 
In this Essay, Professor Van Alstine addresses the power of federal 
courts to develop the law within the scope of a treaty. In response to an 
earlier essay by Professor John Yoo in this Review, Professor Van Alstine 
first challenges the assertion that the President has the sole constitutional 
power to interpret all treaties. He argues that for those treaties that create 
directly enforceable domestic law, the Supremacy Clause and the judicial 
power of Article III of the Constitution allocate final authority over inter-
pretation and application to the federal courts. Professor Van Alstine con-
tends that the closest formal and functional analog for such self-executing 
treaties is Article I legislation. As a result, in parallel with established law 
with regard to statutory delegations, there is no constitutional infirmity in 
a deliberate and circumscribed delegation of common-law powers by the 
constitutional treaty-lawmakers (the President with a supermajority of the 
Senate). Respect for the important role of the executive branch in the con-
duct of foreign affairs may justify calibrated deference to the reasonable 
interpretive views of the President. Professor Van Alstine nonetheless ex-
plains that this respect does not displace the core judicial responsibility to 
interpret those treaties that create domestically enforceable rights nor in-
validate a properly circumscribed delegation of an authority to develop the 
law within their scope. 
INTRODUCTION 
A formal treaty ratified in conformance with constitutionally pre-
scribed procedures is the most concrete, and should be the least controver-
sial, form of international legal cooperation. In recent years, however, the 
growth of social and economic interdependence on a global scale has led to 
a substantial increase in international cooperation on shared legal concerns. 
The result has been an expansion of treaty law into an ever broader field of 
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governance. Matters such as extradition1 and taxation/ for example, have 
joined the traditional treaty subjects of peace, arms control, and amity3 in 
international agreements commonly accepted by the United States. In the 
field of human rights as well, the United States has ratified numerous trea-
ties designed to protect individual civil and political rights against abuse on 
both international and domestic levels.4 The United States also has ratified 
a number of less well-known, but nonetheless significant treaties mandat-
ing international cooperation on a variety of private-law matters, including 
civil procedure5 and family law.6 Similarly, in recent years, a broad range 
of conventions have emerged that are designed to unify the law governing 
international commercial transactions. 7 
I. The United States has ratified well over fifty extradition treaties with other countries. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3181 (2000) (listing such treaties). For a particularly controversial interpretation of such an 
extradition treaty, see United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding that an 
extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico did not prohibit the forcible abduction of a 
Mexican citizen in Mexico by U.S. officials). See also Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 
1045, 1050-52 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that this abduction and arbitrary detention nonetheless violated 
international law). 
2. There are nearly fifty tax treaties in effect between the United States and its major trading 
partners. See Ernest R. Larkins, US. Income Tax Treaties in Research and Planning: A Primer, 18 VA. 
TAX REv. 133 app. (1998) (listing the tax treaties in effect between the United States and other 
countries). 
3. The United States began concluding treaties of "Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation" 
with other countries as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century. See Treaties of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation With Latin American Countries, I I.L.M. 91, 92-96 (1962) (listing treaties 
concluded between 1815 and 1962); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994) (Treaties & Conventions) (setting 
forth an updated partial list of such treaties). 
4. Most recently, in 1994, the United States ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Annex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.411984/72. See 
TREATY AFFAIRS STAFF, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY I, 1999, at 466 (1999). 
For other human rights treaties ratified by the United States, see Mary Becker, Towards a Progressive 
Politics and a Progressive Constitution, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 2007, 2012-14 (2001) (citing the 
ratification by the United States of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination in 1994, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1992, and the 
International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1986). 
5. See, e.g., Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970,23 U.S.T. 2555; Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 
U.S.T. 361. 
6. See, e.g., Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, concluded Oct. 
25, 1980, T.A.I.S. NO. 11, 670. Most recently, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the 
Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, concluded 
May 29, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. 105-51, at III (1998). 
7. The most prominent of these is the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods [hereinafter CISG], opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 
which the United States ratified in 1986. I analyze this convention and its commercial law progeny at 
length in Part II.B. See infra notes 180-99 and accompanying text. 
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Because, unlike in some other countries, 8 treaties in the United States 
can have a direct and immediate effect of their own force, they potentially 
provide a powerful vehicle for legal change. The Supremacy Clause ele-
vates treaties to "the supreme Law of the Land."9 When properly approved 
and ratified, 10 therefore, their substantive provisions can both preempt 
conflicting state law and even displace earlier federal statutes. 11 As a result, 
the recent expansion of treaty law has spawned increasingly heated 
academic debates over the proper scope of the treaty power.12 
These debates thus far have distilled into two main controversies. The 
first, which principally proceeds from notions of federalism, challenges the 
accepted view that there are no substantive limitations on the use of the 
treaty power to displace state law.13 The second, separate debate, propelled 
principally by Professor John Yoo, argues that, absent further implement-
ing legislation, the structure of the Constitution precludes judicial en-
forcement of a treaty within the scope of Congress's Article I powers. 14 
8. See Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. 
CIN. L. REv. 367, 373 (I985) (observing that "relatively few countries have adopted the doctrine of 
self-executing treaties"); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate 
Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI-KENT L. REv. 57I, 575 (I99I) 
(observing that in some countries, "such as the United Kingdom, treaties •.. require parliamentary 
action before the courts will recognize individual rights"). I review the distinction in the United States 
between so-called self-executing and non-self-executing treaties infra notes 50-71 and accompanying 
text. 
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § I, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority 
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land •... "). 
IO. See U.S. CoNST. art. II,§ 2. 
II. See Whitney v. Robertson, I24 U.S. I90, I94 (I888) (stating that when an act of legislation 
conflicts with the self-executing provisions of a treaty, ''the one last in date will control the other''); see 
also Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 37I, 376 (1998) ("[A]n Act of Congress •.. is on a full parity with a 
treaty" and "when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the 
e:ctent of conflict renders the treaty null.") (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I, I8 (I957)). 
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
I3. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MicH. L. REv. 390 
(1998) (arguing that interests of federalism reflected in the notion of a national government of 
enumerated powers place substantive limits on the scope of the treaty power); David M. Golove, 
Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty 
Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075 (2000) (disagreeing with Professor Bradley's arguments on the basis of 
an historical analysis of the treaty power and a textual and structural analysis of the Constitution); 
Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MicH. L. REv. 98 (2000) 
(responding that Professor Golove's criticisms are inconsistent with recent Supreme Court federalism 
decisions). 
14. See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the 
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Non-Self-Execution]; John 
C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 
CoLUM. L. REv. 22I8 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking]; see also MartinS. 
Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme 
Law of the Land", 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2095 (1999); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 
CoLUM. L. REv. 2154 (1999). 
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In a recent essay in this Review, Professor Y oo addresses a new issue, 
the formal and functional considerations that govern treaty interpretation. 15 
In light of the expanding scope of treaties in our legal system, this issue 
carries the potential to become both practically more significant and sub-
stantively more controversial than in the past. Surprisingly, however, the 
matter of treaty interpretation has thus far received only limited scholarly 
attention. 16 This fact is all the more curious, as Professor Y oo notes, 17 
given that the parallel subject of statutory interpretation is now one of the 
most animated themes of American legal thought.18 
Professor Y oo bases his analysis of treaty interpretation on a re-
evaluation 19 of a heated, historical debate during the Reagan administration 
over the power of the President to reinterpret the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty ("ABM") between the United States and what was then the 
U.S.S.R.20 Briefly, Professor Yoo's position is that formal and functional 
constitutional considerations lead to the conclusion that the President has 
"unilateral freedom to interpret and reinterpret treaties."21 In the course of 
his argument, Professor Y oo also challenges the notion that the federal 
courts could have a substantial role to play in the development of treaty 
15. John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and 
Treaty Interpretation, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 851 (2001) [hereinafter Yoo, Politics as Law]. 
16. See David J. Bederrnan, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REv. 953 
(1994); Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 687 (1998); James 
C. Wolf, Jurisprudence ofTreaty Interpretation, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1023 (1988). 
17. See Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 879 n.85. 
18. For an introduction into the contentious literature on this subject, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. 
& PhilipP. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987); Cass R. 
Sunstein,Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 426-28 ( 1989). Perhaps 
the most spirited debate over statutory interpretation concerns the proper role of legislative history in 
interpretive inquiries. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 30-35 (1997) (criticizing 
the use of legislative history); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 61, 68-70 (1994) (same); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The 
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) (comprehensively reviewing the emergence of 
textualist approaches to statutory interpretation). 
19. As Professor Y oo describes in some detail, a suggestion by the Reagan administration that it 
had the right to reinterpret the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty sparked a contentious debate in both 
political circles and legal scholarship. See Y oo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 851-68 (describing 
the controversy at the time). For an introduction to the scholarly debate on this subject, see Lawrence J. 
Block et al., The Senate's Pie-in-the-Sky Treaty Interpretation: Power and the Quest for Legislative 
Supremacy, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1481 (1989); David A. Koplow, Constitutional Bait and 
Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1353 (1989); Eugene 
V. Rostow, The Reinterpretation Debate and Constitutional Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1451 (I 989). 
20. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 
U.S.T. 3435. 
21. Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 868 ("[B]oth formalist and functionalist approaches to 
the separation of powers lead to the conclusion that the President ought to have the unilateral freedom 
to interpret and reinterpret treaties."); see also id. at 865 ("Whether we apply textualist or dynamic 
notions of interpretation to treaties, it is clear that the President must enjoy the power to interpret 
international agreements on behalf of the nation."). 
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law.22 I advanced an argument in support of that notion in an earlier work 
entitled Dynamic Treaty Interpretation.23 Specifically, I argued there that 
certain private-law treaties delegate to federal courts the authority to de-
velop the law within the treaties' scope.24 
In his essay, Professor Yoo questions the constitutional foundation for 
such an argument. The notion of a delegation of common-law powers 
through treaties, he asserts, "suffers from [a] failure to identify any 
constitutional authorization for such an enormous transfer of power from 
the treatymakers to the courts .... "25 Indeed, he suggests that such 
a delegation "would arguably violate the Constitution if undertaken domes-
tically."26 Professor Yoo raises an excellent question, indeed one for which 
there is virtually no other scholarly commentary and only limited judicial 
authority. Here, I take up a general response to his challenge. 
My argument proceeds in three principal parts. Part I responds to the 
formal assertion that all treaties are fundamentally executive in nature, as 
well as its consequence that treaty interpretation is a matter within the uni-
lateral control of the President. Specifically, I argue that if limited to those 
treaties that solely create sovereign obligations on the international plane,27 
there may be some merit in this point.28 But for those treaties that create 
rights or obligations directly enforceable as domestic law, I contend that 
the closest formal and functional analog is Article I legislation. For such 
treaties, the Supremacy Clause and the judicial power in Article III to-
gether allocate the final authority over their application and interpretation 
to the courts. 29 
Part II of this Essay then turns to the constitutionality of delegation to 
the federal courts of an enhanced interpretive power to develop the law 
within the scope of a treaty. Substantial, compelling authority now sup-
ports the proposition that separation of powers and federalism concerns do 
not prohibit Congress's deliberate and circumscribed delegation of a simi-
lar power through Article I legislation.30 I will argue in Part II that those 
treaties that create rights enforceable by individuals in domestic courts, 
22. Yoo, Politics as Law,supra note 15, at 879 n.85. 
23. Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 753-58. 
24. !d. 
25. Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 879 n.85. 
26. Id. 
27. Professor Y oo seems to suggest such a qualification at the conclusion of his work. See id. at 
914 ("[A] large number of treaties, especially arms control and politico-military agreements, do not 
create any legally-enforceable rights for individuals, but rather regulate the international relations 
between two or more nation-states. As such, they represent political arrangements, not domestic law."). 
28. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
29. See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text. 
30. See infra Part II.A. 
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which are properly viewed as "equivalent to an act of the legislature,"31 
reflect a compelling parallel with the constitutional foundation for delega-
tion in the statutory context. As a result, there is no constitutional infirmity 
in a deliberate and circumscribed delegation to the federal courts of a 
power to develop the law within the scope of such treaties. 32 Indeed, a clear 
example of such a delegation under a treaty already exists. As we shall see 
in Part II.B, the private-law conventions analyzed in Dynamic Treaty 
Interpretation expressly authorize the courts to fill the gaps in their regula-
tory scheme as they emerge through judicial examination over time.33 
Finally, Part III addresses Professor Y oo' s claim that functional con-
siderations mandate absolute deference to the President in the interpreta-
tion of treaties. I will argue that, while the executive branch may have 
structural advantages over the judicial branch in interpreting those treaties 
that address national defense, diplomacy, and similar matters at the core of 
our nation's foreign policy, all treaties do not raise such concerns equally. 
Arguments founded on executive preeminence in foreign affairs, while im-
portant in some contexts, dissolve in others. 34 Likewise, for some treaties, 
such as the private commercial law conventions discussed in Dynamic 
Treaty Interpretation,35 there is little reason to assume any special execu-
tive-branch expertise as compared to the traditional means of interpretation 
through domestic judicial proceedings.36 In short, while some form of cali-
brated deference may be appropriate, foreign affairs and executive exper-
tise rhetoric does not justifY absolute judicial abdication in favor of fleeting 
executive views on the interpretation of all treaties. 
I 
THE JUDICIAL POWER AND TREATY INTERPRETATION 
Professor Yoo's point of departure on the subject of treaty interpreta-
tion is a series of formal arguments about the nature of treaties in our con-
stitutional system. His core contention is that the placement of the Treaty 
Clause in Article II of the Constitution "indicates that the power to make 
treaties, and by extension to interpret them, remains an executive one.'m 
He bolsters this argument by citing to the Vesting Clause in Article I, 
Section 1.38 Because that clause limits the legislative powers allocated to 
31. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829). I explore this observation in greater detail infra 
notes 149-64 and accompanying text. 
32. See infra Part II.B. 
33. See infra notes 179-90 and accompanying text. 
34. See infra notes 233-36 and accompanying text. 
35. See Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 753-58. 
36. I discuss this point in greater detail, infra notes 243-47 and accompanying text. 
37. See Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 870; see also id. at 869 ("A textual examination 
of the Constitution indicates that the treaty power is fundamentally executive in nature."). 
38. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress 
ofthe United States .... "). 
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Congress to those "herein granted," he reasons that any powers found in 
Article II (such as the treaty power) cannot be legislative in nature.39 To be 
sure, the Constitution mandates the participation of a legislative institution 
(the Senate) in the treaty-making process.40 In his view, however, this par-
ticipation merely reveals that the Senate plays a role in the exercise of ex-
ecutive functions, and not that treaty making is a legislative powerY 
The principal target ofProfessor Yoo's observations appears to be the 
balance of power between the executive and legislative branches in matters 
of treaty interpretation.42 But his argument that the treaty power's location 
in Article II implies that the President has ''unilateral authority"43 to inter-
pret (and reinterpret) treaties has significant implications for the role of the 
judiciary as well. If his formal argument is correct, then there are deriva-
tive limitations on the traditional judicial responsibility in that context "to 
say what the law is."44 
Before examining the propriety of a delegation of common-law pow-
ers through the vehicle of a treaty, therefore, we must first determine the 
fundamental nature of treaties, and thus the allocation of authority over 
their interpretation, in our constitutional structure. 
A. The Nature ofTreaties 
The first step in our analysis is a familiar, but nonetheless essential, 
one. As Professor Y oo has analyzed in some detail, prior to the Framing, 
treaties were traditionally understood to be mere contracts between sover-
eign nations. 45 Professor Y oo thus quotes Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 
39. See Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 869 ("In order to give every word in the 
Constitution meaning, we should construe th[e] 'herein granted' language as limiting Congress's 
legislative powers to the list enumerated in Article I, Section 8, while Article II's Vesting Clause must 
refer to inherent Executive and judicial powers unenumerated elsewhere in the document."). 
40. U.S. CaNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (conferring upon the President "the Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur"). 
41. See Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 869 ("[T]he Senate's participation in treaty 
making and appointments merely indicates the dilution of the unitary nature of the executive branch, 
rather than the transformation of these functions into legislative powers."); see also id. at 870 ("The 
Senate's advice and consent power does not transform the treaty power into a legislative function; 
instead, it makes the Senate part of the Executive branch for purposes of making international 
agreements."). 
42. See id. at 874 (suggesting that the focus was on the propriety of"[g]ranting the President the 
power to interpret treaties without the Senate's consent ... "); id. at 875 (arguing that because of 
executive dominance in foreign affairs "there seems to be little constitutional reason to privilege Senate 
understandings of the text [of the ABM Treaty] over those promoted by the President"). 
43. See id. at 868; id. at 878 (arguing that the President should have "unilateral authority to 
reinterpret treaties"). 
44. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
45. See Yoo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note 14, at 1982-2069; Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 
15, at 882-901. But see Flaherty, supra note 14, at 2105-51 (comprehensively challenging Professor 
Yoo's historical analysis of the treaty power). 
HeinOnline -- 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1270 2002
1270 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1263 
No. 75, who noted that "the essence ofthe legislative authority is to enact 
laws, or in other words to prescribe rules for the regulation of the society," 
whereas the objects of treaties, "are CONTRACTS with foreign 
nations .... "46 Because their essential nature involved sovereign actors 
defining their own obligations to entities external to their own legal sys-
tems, therefore, treaties reflected something fundamentally other than do-
mestic law.47 In other words, this international (that is, external) contract 
paradigm held that treaties derive their force as law not from domestic 
sources, but rather from an elastic duty of "good faith" owed merely to for-
eign sovereigns.48 
The Supremacy Clause and Article III, however, marked a departure 
from this traditional model. Without express limitation, Article VI provides 
that the Constitution, laws, and "all Treaties" shall be "the supreme Law of 
the Land."49 To carry this equivalent status into effect, Article III estab-
lishes that the judicial power extends not only to cases arising under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, but also to "treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their Authority."50 The inclusion within the 
judicial power in Article III thus placed treaties on an equal footing with 
Article I laws. 
Beginning with some of its earliest examinations of the subject, the 
Supreme Court recognized that in the United States, treaties may function 
as more than mere contracts between sovereigns. The Court's opinion in 
Foster v. Neilson remains perhaps the clearest statement of this recogni-
tion: 
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a 
legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be 
accomplished . . . . In the United States a different principle is 
established. Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the 
land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as 
equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself 
without the aid of any legislative provision. 51 
46. Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 892 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 504 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
47. See Bederman, supra note 16, at 954 ("The strange birth and schizophrenic life of treaties has 
caused them to be seen as something fundamentally other than public law."). 
48. -See The FEDERALIST No. 75, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
("Treaties have the force of law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith."); see also Yoo, 
Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 892 (setting forth this quote by Hamilton); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, 
Treaty-based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1082 ( 1992) [hereinafter 
Vazquez, Treaty Rights] (noting the widely held view regarding their international effect "that treaties, 
as international instruments, establish legal obligations and correlative legal rights only of the nations 
that are parties to them, not of individuals"). 
49. U.S. CoNST. art. VI,§ 1, cl. 2. 
50. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
51. 27 u.s. 253,314 (1829). 
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As this foundational pronouncement of the Supreme Court makes 
clear, the significant diversity in treaty substance precludes any reliable 
generalizations about the fundamental nature of all treaties. 52 Some treaties 
may indeed solely "import a contract."53 That is, they may involve merely 
a promise by the United States as a sovereign entity to a foreign sovereign. 
In such a case, the treaty may indeed "address[] itself to the political, not 
the judicial department."54 
This "sovereign contract" paradigm collapses, however, when gener-
alized beyond that specific class of treaties. Some treaties create rights that 
are enforceable directly by individuals in domestic courts. From a formal 
perspective, the Supremacy Clause gives such treaties the force of law, 
indeed the supreme law of the land. Moreover, Article III makes clear that 
the judicial power, which of its essence is the interpretive authority "to say 
what the law is,"55 extends to treaties as well. As part of the law of the 
land, these domestically enforceable treaties must also fall within the ex-
ecutive's obligation in Article II, Section 3 to "take care" that the "Laws" 
are faithfully executed. 56 
As a result, until terminated,57 their provisions should bind the 
President just as does any other form of extant federal law. 58 As Professor 
52. If one follows the alternate suggestion advanced by Professor Y oo that (beyond a mere "soft" 
rule presumption against self-execution) the structural Constitution entirely prohibits self-executing 
treaties, at least on matters within Congress's Article I, Section 8 authority, the possibility for treaties 
of a legislative nature radically diminishes. See Y oo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note 14, at 2092 
(suggesting the possibility of such an approach); Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 14, 
at 2220 (describing this approach as a "hard" rule by which "[t]reaties cannot receive judicial 
enforcement in areas that fall within Congress's Article I, Section 8 powers, without statutory 
implementation by Congress"). Stripped of this possibility, the debate over self-execution in our 
constitutional system focuses upon the question of what standards courts should apply to distinguish 
between those treaties that create immediately enforceable domestic law rights and those that do not. 
While important, this question ultimately does not control the separate issue analyzed here of whether, 
for those treaties that do create such rights in accordance with the constitutionally prescribed standards, 
a treaty may delegate to the judiciary enhanced interpretive authority for matters within their scope. 
53. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829). 
54. /d. at 314; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 30 (1831) ("There is then a great 
deal of sense in the [traditional] rule ..• that as between sovereigns, breaches of treaty were not 
breaches of contract cognizable in a court of justice .... "). 
55. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
56. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 3 (requiring that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed"); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deforence and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. 
REv. 649, 655 (2000) [hereinafter Bradley, Chevron Deforence] (stating that self-executing treaties 
"presumably are also part of the 'Laws' referred to in Article IT's Take Care Clause"). 
57. Professor Y oo has argued that the President should have a unilateral authority to terminate 
treaties. See Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 873-74 ("Although the constitutional text is silent 
on the issue, most commentators, courts, and government entities believe that the President may 
terminate a treaty unilaterally.") (citing, inter alia, Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 
1979), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated as moot, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)). Once again, there 
may be merit in this observation with regard to treaties that solely create international, contract-like 
obligations to foreign nations. From a formal constitutional perspective, however, there is reason to 
question the authority of the President to unilaterally terminate treaties that have created rights 
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Carlos Vazquez has observed, the inclusion of treaties within Article III 
and the Supremacy Clause "altered-or made irrelevant-for domestic 
purposes those attributes of treaties that distinguished them from laws: it 
made them operative on individuals and enforceable in the courts by 
individuals."59 And indeed, in nearly all cases that have come before it, the 
Supreme Court has either expressly found that a treaty creates enforceable 
rights of individuals or has proceeded directly to interpret and apply a 
treaty without even raising the issue. 60 
The extension of the judicial power of Article III to treaties does not 
mean, however, that individuals may enforce any treaty at any time.61 
Rather, building on the premise of Foster v. Neilson, the Supreme Court 
has long distinguished between what have come to be known as self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties, that is, between those that are 
directly enforceable by individuals in domestic courts and those that are 
not. 62 The doctrine of non-self-execution holds that, just like other forms of 
domestic law,63 examination of the substance of a treaty may reveal that its 
enforceable as domestic law. As the Supreme Court has recently and emphatically stated in the 
structurally parallel case of the Line-Item Veto Act, "[t]here is no provision in the Constitution that 
authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes." Clinton v. City of New York, 524 
U.S. 417, 438 (1998). Cf Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 56, at 655-56 ("Whether the 
Executive branch has the power to unilaterally terminate a treaty (and thereby avoid the domestic-law 
obligation to comply with it) has not been resolved."). 
58. See Bradley, Cheveron Deference, supra note 56, at 655 (making the same observation). 
59. Vazquez, Treaty Rights, supra note 48, at 1108-09. 
60. For a canvassing of Supreme Court authority on these points, see Carlos Manuel Vazquez, 
The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 716 n.96 (1995) [hereinafter 
Vazquez, Four Doctrines] (arguing that, other than the subsequently reversed decision in Foster v. 
Neilson, the Supreme Court has only once denied relief because a treaty was not self-executing, and 
even that decision was ambiguous). See also id. (citing a number of cases in which the Supreme Court 
expressly found that a treaty was self-executing); id. (citing numerous additional cases in which the 
Court interpreted a treaty without even questioning that it was enforceable by the courts). Separately, 
the Supreme Court has expressly found that, notwithstanding the political question doctrine, courts 
have the authority to interpret treaties. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 
230 (1986). 
61. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 60, 699 ("The recognition that treaties, along with 
the Constitution and federal statutes, are 'law' and therefore enforceable by the courts without prior 
legislative transformation into domestic law does not, of course, mean that treaties may be enforced in 
court by any individual at any time."). 
62. See, e.g., Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902) (noting the distinction); The Head 
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (observing that the Constitution places self-executing treaties 
in the same category as other laws of Congress that create rights "capable of enforcement as between 
private parties"); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (holding that a treaty is to be regarded as 
"equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative 
provision"). 
63. A phenomenon that parallels the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties exists with certain 
statutory delegations to administrative agencies of the discretion to adopt implementing regulations. 
Although the statutory authorization qualifies as law, no enforceable individual rights or obligations 
exist until the agency decides to exercise its authority to issue the regulations. See also Y oo, Treaties 
and Public Lawmaking, supra note 14, at 2244-48 (discussing the various aspects of statutory law that 
are not immediately enforceable by federal courts). 
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provisions are not (or not yet) amenable to judicial enforcement in domes-
tic courts. Some non-self-executing treaties, for example, may be merely 
precatory or otherwise too vague for judicial enforcement. 64 Some may 
address political issues over which courts properly hesitate to exercise ju-
risdiction in the absence of particularly clear guidance.65 Others may dele-
gate to Congress the decision as to whether, and if so to what extent, they 
should be given force as domestic law through Article I legislation.66 Still 
others may not be enforceable because of a more conspicuous absence, 
both in their own provisions and by reference to other sources oflaw, of a 
private right of action for individuals. 67 In all these cases, even though the 
Senate has properly given its consent, the substance of the treaties reveals 
that the discretion concerning the timing and means of their enforcement 
has first been entrusted to constitutional institutions other than the federal 
judiciary. 68 
The particular constitutional constraints on the recognition of treaties 
as enforceable domestic law have been the subject of exhaustive historical 
64. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 441 (1987) (examining the distinction 
b~tween mandatory obligations and mere precatory provisions under the United Nations Protocol 
Relating to the Status ofRefugees); Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 721-25 (1952) (holding that 
the provisions of the United Nations Charter were too vague to be self-executing). In this sense, there is 
a parallel between the notion that the provisions of a treaty may be too vague for enforcement and one 
aspect of the political question doctrine that asks whether there are "judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards." See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see also Vazquez, Four 
Doctrines, supra note 60, at 713-15 (exploring the same parallel); Vazquez, Treaty Rights, supra note 
48, at 1130-33 (same). 
65. Arms control treaties and the like, involving core questions of national security, may well fall 
within a class whose political nature places them beyond judicial enforcement (and thus interpretation) 
absent clear evidence to the contrary. See also Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 60, at 717. 
Professor Vazquez suggests that "certain treaties" may not be 
I d. 
judicially enforceable under our Constitution because they bear too closely on national 
security or are otherwise too sensitive for judicial involvement A claim that an arms control 
agreement requires the United States to dismantle weapons, for example, might be 
non justiciable on this ground even if the agreement is neither precatory nor vague. 
66. See Vazquez, Treaty Rights, supra note 48, at 1125-29 (discussing the "prototype of a non-
self-executing treaty" as one that does not create enforceable rights of its own accord, but rather 
"delegates" law-making authority to Congress). 
67. See Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 60, at 719-21. 
68. Some commentators have argued that the very notion of a non-self-executing treaty is 
unconstitutional because the Supremacy Clause elevates all treaties to the supreme law of the land. See, 
e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760, 760 (1988) (arguing that "[t]he 
distinction found in certain cases between 'self-executing' and 'non-self-executing' treaties is a 
judicially invented notion that is patently inconsistent with express language in the Constitution 
affirming that 'all Treaties ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land"'); Charles H. Dearborn III, Note, 
The Domestic Legal Effect of Declarations that Treaty Provisions Are Not Self-Executing, 57 TEx. L. 
REv. 233, 233-34 (1979) (arguing that declarations attached upon Senate consent that a treaty is not 
self-executing "are of dubious validity, probably have no binding effect on United States courts, and 
should not be used as aids in construing the treaties"). 
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and structural analysis by Professor Y oo and his critics. 69 We need not 
wade into the thicket of this thorny debate over whether the Constitution 
requires a presumption for or against self-execution, however, to extract 
the broader principle.7° For our purposes here it is sufficient to observe, in 
accordance with established Supreme Court precedent, 71 that some, though 
not all, treaties create rights or obligations that are directly enforceable as 
domestic law in federal courts. 
B. Treaty Interpretation 
Contrary to the sovereign contract paradigm, therefore, self-executing 
treaties are properly viewed as the formal and functional equivalent of 
Article I legislation.72 Like statutory law, these treaties by definition in-
volve the government's creation of individual rights (or obligations), and 
are enforceable in court at the behest of or against individuals. To return to 
the quote from Alexander Hamilton, such treaties reflect "the essence 
of the legislative authority," for they directly "prescribe rules for the 
regulation of the society."73 
In accordance with this reasoning, the Supreme Court itself has long 
recognized that the role of the courts in the application of a self-executing 
treaty is functionally identical to that for Article I legislation. Indeed, in its 
foundational pronouncement in Foster v. Neilson, the Court described such 
a treaty as "equivalent to an act of the legislature."74 Likewise, in the later 
case of Whitney v. Robertson, the Court emphasized that where treaty pro-
visions "are self-executing, that is, require no legislation to make them 
69. See generally Yoo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note 14 (challenging the traditional acceptance 
of self-executing treaties on the basis of an analysis of the historical background and structure of the 
Constitution). But see Flaherty, supra note 14, at 2105-51 (disagreeing with Professor Yoo's historical 
account); Vazquez, supra note 14, at 2158-68 (same). 
70. See Y oo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note 14, at 2092 (concluding that there should at least be 
a "presumption" against self-execution); Y oo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, supra note 14, at 2220 
(describing a "soft" rule, under which "courts can remain true to the text, structure, and original 
understanding of the Constitution by requiring the treaty-makers to issue a clear statement if they want 
a treaty to be self-executing"). But see Vazquez, supra note 14, at 2157-58 (concluding, even after 
reviewing the Supreme Court authority cited by Professor Yoo, that the Supremacy Clause "adopt[s] a 
default rule that treaties have the force of domestic law, a rule that may be reversed by the treaty-
makers through a clear statement in the treaty itself (or reservation thereto)"). 
71. See supra note 62 (citing such authority). 
72. See also Vazquez, supra note 14, at 2210-11 (arguing in response to Professor Yoo's 
structural constitutional arguments that "if we equate 'legislation' and 'law' ... then the combination 
of Articles II and VI would produce a clear allocation of legislative power to the President (and 
Senate)"). 
73. See THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see 
also Flaherty, supra note 14, at 2138-39 (analyzing the background and context of this quote in greater 
detail); THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing 
that "[w]hat is a LEGISLATIVE power but a power of making LAWS?"). 
74. 27 u.s. 253,314 (1829). 
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operative ... they have the force and effect of a legislative enactment."75 
The Court was even more explicit in the The Head Money Cases.16 There, 
in the process of drawing a contrast to mere sovereign contracts, it con-
cluded that treaty provisions that create individual rights "partake of the 
nature of municipal law ... [and] the Constitution of the United States 
places such provisions as these in the same category as other laws of 
Congress.'m When, then, the rights created by a treaty "are of a nature to 
be enforced in a court of justice, that court resorts to the treaty for a rule of 
decision for the case before it as it would to a statute."78 
To be sure, treaties come into being through an Article II process 
formally initiated by the President79 that differs from that for Article I leg-
islation. But, significantly, where the President initiates the Article II proc-
ess for the creation of law, the Constitution also requires the involvement 
of the legislature, namely a supermajority ofthe Senate, before a treaty can 
obtain the force of domestic law. Moreover, the Supremacy Clause ex-
pressly provides that, for those treaties whose substance so directs, the con-
stitutional product of the Article II process is the same as Article I 
lawmaking. 80 When a treaty addresses itself to the courts, therefore, Article 
III requires that they apply it just as they would a statute or any other form 
of judicially enforceable law. 
Professor Yoo's response to this well-established constitutional law is 
to assert simply that the treaty power is found in Article II. In his 
view, because Article II vests executive power in the President,81 the mere 
75. 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). Professor Louis Henkin has also equated self-executing treaties 
with legislation. See Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Niagara Reservation, 
56 CoLUM. L. REv. ll51, ll69 (1956) (arguing that "Article VI establishes that the treaty power 
includes an important power to legislate domestically"). See also Golove, supra note 13, at 1286. 
Golove observed that 
!d. 
[t]he treaty power empowers the President and Senate, incident to making agreements with 
foreign states, to promulgate laws. As a result, whenever a treaty makes stipulations on 
subjects falling within the scope of Congress's legislative authorities, the treaty overrides the 
general separation of powers principle that legislative authority is vested in Congress. 
76. 112 u.s. 580 (1884). 
77. !d. at 598. 
78. !d. at 599; see also Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. 410, 439 (1838) ("Treaties are the law of the 
land, and a rule of decision in all courts."). 
79. There has been some debate over whether the intent behind "advice" language in the Treaty 
Clause requires the Senate's active participation from the very beginning of the treaty-making process. 
But, as Professor Yoo correctly observes, actual practice after the adoption of the Constitution quickly 
excluded formal Senate involvement until after negotiations were completed. See Y oo, Politics as Law, 
supra note 15, at 895-901. 
80. To overcome the clear text of the Supremacy Clause, Professor Yoo is forced to suggest an 
"alternate approach to the Supremacy Clause" under which the political branches, instead of the courts, 
could be the institutions obligated to enforce treaty law. See Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking, 
supra note 14, at 2249-53 (advancing this argument). But see Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra 
note 14, at 2169-73 (challenging Professor Yoo's textual reading of the Constitution, in particular, the 
Supremacy Clause, with regard to treaties). 
81. See U.S. CONST. art. II,§ l. 
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placement in that article of the power to make treaties must mean that the 
sole constitutional authority over the interpretation (and reinterpretation) of 
all treaties also resides with the President. 82 This hyperstructuralist view is 
unconvincing for a number of reasons. 
First, the text and structure of the Constitution beyond Article II is 
inconsistent with Professor Yoo's attempt to reason "by extension"83 that 
the power of the President to make treaties (with, significantly, the consent 
of the Senate) includes the judicial power to interpret and apply them. In a 
near exact textual parallel with Article II's Vesting Clause, Article III, 
Section 1 provides that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress 
may from time to time ordain and establish."84 As we have seen, this judi-
cial power expressly extends to treaties as well. 85 
Second, the Supreme Court long ago established that the initial power 
to create law does not include a subsequent power to interpret it. The 
Constitution expressly vests in Congress the power to create federal law 
through Article I legislation (even over the veto of the President). The 
Supreme Court has nonetheless emphatically declared that this power to 
create federal law does not by extension grant to a later Congress the au-
thority over its interpretation. Specifically, the Court has concluded that the 
interpretive opinions of a later Congress form a "hazardous basis" for dis-
cerning the meaning of an earlier statute, 86 and indeed are of "very little, if 
any, significance."87 Even as the preeminent institution in creating Article I 
legislation, a subsequent Congress does not have the power to interpret an 
earlier statute without adhering to the full constitutional process for the 
creation of binding legal norms (that is, without passing a law signed by, or 
over the veto of, the President). 
82. See Y oo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 864 (criticizing the Reagan administration with 
regard to the first ABM reinterpretation controversy because it "fail[ed] to make the stronger argument 
that the President has the sole constitutional power to reinterpret treaties on behalf of the nation ... "); 
id. at 878 (asserting that the President has "unilateral authority to reinterpret treaties"). 
83. !d. at 870 (arguing that "the Treaty Clause's placement in Article II, Section 2 indicates that 
the power to make treaties, and by extension to interpret them, remains an executive one"). 
84. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I. 
85. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. I. ("The Judicial Power shall extend to ... Treaties made, or 
which shall be made" under the authority of the United States.). 
86. SeeS. Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 355 (1998) ("We have often observed, 
however, that 'the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring intent of an 
earlier one."' (quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49 (1963))); see 
also Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633,650 (1990) (same); United States v. 
Price, 361 U.S. 304,313 (1960) (same). 
87. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 (1968) (quoting Rainwater v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 590, 593 (1958)); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank 
of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994) ("[\V]e have observed on more than one occasion that the 
interpretation given by one Congress ... to an earlier statute is of little assistance in discerning the 
meaning of that statute."( quoting Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 
(1989))). 
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The observation that the treaty power is found in Article II and not in 
Article I in this respect is a distinction without a difference. Like Article I 
legislation, the result of the cooperation of the executive and legislative 
branches in the creation of self-executing treaties under Article II is do-
mestically enforceable federal law. Once this occurs, that the President had 
the initial power to make such a treaty does not mean that he retains the 
judicial power to interpret and apply it, any more than the Senate's partici-
pation in the process grants it such a power. 88 While foreign policy con-
cerns may justify some form of calibrated deference to the interpretive 
views of the executive, 89 Article III ultimately vests the judicial power over 
treaties in the federal courts. 
In broad purpose, Article III reflects the insight that control by one of 
the political branches over the power both to create and to apply the law 
threatens the structural protections of the Constitution.90 Indeed, as the 
Supreme Court observed in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., one of the core 
purposes of Article III was to abolish the practice, common at the time of 
the adoption of the Constitution, of state political bodies acting as the fmal 
judicial authority on individual cases.91 In the case of those treaties that 
operate as domestically enforceable law, the separation of powers doctrine 
thus operates to ensure that one political branch (here, the executive) can-
not combine its authority to create legal rights and obligations with an un-
checked power to interpret and apply them to specific citizens and 
disputes.92 
Moreover, the view that the executive has exclusive authority to in-
terpret treaties renders irrelevant the Senate's mandatory participation in 
the creation of Article II treaty law. If, subsequent to the Senate's advice 
88. Like Article I legislation, the Supreme Court has held that those involved in the ratification of 
a treaty do not thereby control its later interpretation. See Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 
183 U.S. 176, ISO (1901) ("The meaning of the treaty cannot be controlled by subsequent explanations 
of some of those who may have voted to ratifY it"). 
89. See infra Part ill.B. 
90. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 207 (James Madison) (J. Gideon ed., 1831) (warning of the 
risks of a "despotic government'' that accompanies the "accumulation of all powers, legislative, 
Executive, and judiciary in the same hands"); id. ("[T]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, 
Executive, and judiciary, in the same hands ... may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny."); id. at 209 (quoting Montesquieu to the effect that "were the power of judging ... joined to 
the Executive power, the judge might behave with all of the violence of an oppressor"). · 
91. See 514 U.S. 211, 217-25 (1995) (describing this purpose of Article III). More broadly, as 
Justice Kennedy insightfully observed in Clinton v. City of New York, "[s]eparation of powers was 
designed to implement a fundamental insight: concentration of power in the hands of a single branch is 
a threat to liberty." 524 U.S. 417,450-51 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
92. When applied to self-executing treaties, Professor Yoo's argument that the President has the 
exclusive power of interpretation also collapses under its own weight. If the President has such 
exclusive authority, then presumably federal courts would not have the authority to even entertain 
causes of action and resolve disputes under such treaties. Alternatively, courts would have to stay all 
actions founded on treaty rights until the executive branch has instructed the courts regarding the 
meaning of the relevant provisions. 
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and consent to a self-executing treaty, the President has a unilateral, unre-
viewable power to interpret (and reinterpret) it, the careful cooperation be-
tween the executive and legislative branches prescribed by the Constitution 
becomes meaningless. Presumably, then, any President would have the 
unilateral authority to disregard the text of a treaty and even express 
Senate reservations to a treaty's substance and effect.93 In short, contrary to 
the Constitution's careful safeguards against arbitrary governmental ac-
tions, the very content of the law would be subject to the fleeting whims of 
executive-branch officials. 
Ultimately Professor Yoo's position on the interpretive power of the 
President clashes with the established principle that treaties, if their sub-
stance so directs, may create individual rights that are directly enforceable 
as federal law in federal courts. For such treaties, an assertion that the ex-
ecutive should have exclusive interpretive authority is inconsistent with 
Article VI's designation of treaties as law, Article III's vesting of final ju-
dicial power in the federal courts, the Supreme Court's long-standing ju-
risprudence that self-executing treaties have "the force and 
effect of a legislative enactment,"94 and the mandatory role of the 
Senate in creating Article II treaty law. 
To be sure, not all self-executing treaties are substantively the same. 
Some, though enforceable by individuals like legislation, in fact may have 
attributes that more closely resemble a sovereign contract. These attributes 
arise, for instance, when nations through a treaty undertake certain sover-
eign obligations owed directly to individual citizens (either the other na-
tion's or their own) that are nonetheless enforceable by way of a private 
right of action or defense. Examples here include extradition and taxation 
treaties.95 These attributes of treaties only suggest, however, that different 
interpretive approaches may be appropriate for different types of treaties, 96 
and that some form of calibrated deference to the interpretive views of the 
93. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 314 (1987) (describing the Senate's 
power to state binding reservations and understandings when giving its consent to a treaty); id. § 303, 
cmt. d (stating that "[t]he Senate may ... give its consent on conditions that do not require change in 
the treaty but relate to its domestic application"); see also Michael J. Glennon, The Constitutional 
Power of the United States Senate to Condition Its Consent to Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 533 
( 1991) (analyzing this power in greater detail). 
94. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); see also supra notes 74-80 and 
accompanying text (describing this Supreme Court jurisprudence in more detail). 
95. See supra notes 1 and 2 (citing extradition and taxation treaties that have been accepted by 
the United States). 
96. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 93, § 325, cmt. D. 
The Restatement states: 
!d. 
Different types of agreements may call for different interpretative 
approaches .... Agreements involving a single transaction between governments, such as a 
transfer of territory or a grant of economic assistance should be construed like similar private 
contracts between private parties. Different approaches to interpretation have developed for 
particular categories of agreements such as extradition treaties, tax treaties, etc. 
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executive may be appropriate even with self-executing treaties.97 But in 
other contexts, the view of treaties as mere contracts regulating the interna-
tional conduct of sovereigns dissolves almost entirely. Some treaties im-
pose no substantive obligations and involve no performance, whether 
domestic or international, by sovereign entities at all. 
This latter class of treaties was the subject of my argument in 
Dynamic Treaty lnterpretation.98 At issue there were a number of self-
executing private-law conventions (some already ratified by the United 
States,99 others waiting to be100) that solely regulate areas of international 
commerciallaw.101 As I noted there, the operative provisions ofthese trea-
ties impose no substantive obligations on the United States in its interna-
tional conduct as a sovereign entity.102 Rather, their subject is purely the 
private relations between private actors involved in defined commercial 
law transactions. Thus, like typical domestic private-law statutes, the sub-
stantive provisions of these treaties contemplate enforcement only by pri-
vate actors and against private actors. 103 As a result, these conventions, as I 
argued in Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, might properly be conceived of 
as "legislative treaties."104 
These self-executing private-law conventions fall squarely within 
the constitutional contemplation of treaties as equivalent to acts of 
legislation.105 Because they solely regulate private relations, involve no 
97. I examine this point in greater detail infra Part III. 
98. See generally Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 696-701. 
99. The most prominent treaty that the United States ratified is the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. See CISG, supra note 7. For information on this treaty, 
see infra note 181. Another example is the United Nations Convention on the Limitation Period in the 
International Sale of Goods (with 1980 Protocol amending the Convention), which United States 
ratified in 1994. See Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, reprinted 
in 13 I.L.M. 952 (1974); Protocol Amending the Convention, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 696 (1980). 
100. For an examination of these treaties, see infra notes 179-99 and accompanying text. 
10 I. In accordance with an occasional practice, some of the commercial law conventions 
examined in Dynamic Treaty Interpretation refer to the member states as "contracting states." See, e.g., 
CISG, supra note 7, art. 1(1). This formal designation does not, however, change the substance of such 
conventions as ones that solely regulate the commercial relations of private entities. 
102. See Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 700-01. The conventions also contain certain diplomatic 
provisions. See, e.g., CISG, supra note 7, arts. 88-101. But these merely respect procedural formalities 
for accession, ratification, denunciation, and the like, and impose no substantive obligations on the 
member states. 
103. See Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 700-01. 
104. See id. at 705-06; see also id. at 700 (observing that the private-law conventions analyzed 
there have the "look and feel of standard federal statutes"). 
105. Professor Y oo has argued that historical references, which distinguish commercial from 
noncommercial treaties, support a presumption of non-self-execution for noncommercial treaties. See 
Yoo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note 14, at 2057-58 (citing statements by the "Federal Farmer''). But as 
with other aspects of the debate on this matter, other scholars have pointed to compelling historical 
evidence to the contrary. See Flaherty, supra note 14, at 2140 (arguing that "[a]s with the thesis against 
self-execution generally, [Professor Y oo] offers no convincing evidence that panicky Antifederalists, or 
the Federalists themselves, widely adopted an understanding that commercial treaties, much less any 
treaty falling within Congress's Article I powers, would not function as the supreme Jaw of the land"). 
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substantive "contractual" obligations by sovereign actors, and contemplate 
no discretionary sovereign conduct at all, they address themselves to the 
judicial, not the political, branches. Moreover, these treaties directly 
create a federal cause of action that private parties may pursue in federal 
courts. 106 Like other forms of domestic law, therefore, the application and 
interpretation of these legislative treaties falls within the judicial power of 
the federal courts under Article III of the Constitution. 
In short, for those treaties that create rights or obligations that are en-
forceable as domestic law by or against individuals, the federal courts have 
the same formal constitutional powers to apply the law as they do with 
Article I legislation. These powers may include not only interpretation of 
the meaning of the law, but also the supplemental authority, as delegated to 
them by those institutions with the constitutional power, to fill in and 
round out the law within the scope of a treaty. 107 As we shall see in Part II 
below, although the federal judiciary may not have inherent developmental 
powers with regard to all treaties, it may obtain those powers through a 
deliberate and circumscribed authorization found in specific treaties them-
selves. 
n 
'TREATY DELEGATION OF DEVELOPMENTAL POWERS 
A. Statutory Delegation 
The premise of the separation of powers doctrine at the core of the 
Constitution is that dividing governmental powers into separate, sometimes 
competing, institutions advances the interests of ordered liberty .108 This 
does not mean, of course, that the legislative, executive, and judicial 
functions exist in hermetically sealed compartments in which each 
branch solely exercises its own, unique powers. 109 Rather, the separation of 
106. See Asante Techs., Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147-52 (2001) (holding 
that the United Nations Sales Convention ratified by the United States creates a private right of action 
in federal courts and preempts state law causes of action within its scope (citing Delchi Carrier SpA v. 
Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1995); Filanto, S.P.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. 
Supp. 1229, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1992))). 
I 07. See infra Part II.B. 
108. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450-51 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(observing that the Framers of the Constitution "used the principles of separation of powers and 
federalism to secure liberty in the fundamental political sense of the term, quite in addition to the idea 
of freedom from intrusive governmental acts" protected by the Bill of Rights); Loving v. United 
States., 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996) (noting that the framers believed that "freedom is imperiled if the 
whole of legislative, executive, and judicial power is in the same hands"); Youngstown Sheet and Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (observing that "the Constitution 
diffuses power the better to secure liberty"). 
109. See Buckley v. Vallejo, 424 U.S. I, 121 (1976) (per curiam) (observing that the Framers 
believed that a "hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another would 
preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively"); Thomas W. Merrill, 
The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. I, 21 (1985) ("[T]he notion that 
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powers doctrine operates within the context of a need for a "workable 
government."110 With this in mind, the Supreme Court has long recognized 
that Congress may delegate to its coordinate branches of government cer-
tain decision-making powers that it otherwise could exercise itself.lll As 
the Court explained in Mistretta v. United States, 112 "in our increasingly 
complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, 
Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power 
under broad directives."113 
The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that Congress may not 
delegate to nonlegislative bodies the entirety of its legislative powers on a 
given subject.114 Nonetheless, as Justice Scalia has observed, the Supreme 
Court has "almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding 
the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those 
executing or applying the law."115 As a result, historically there have been 
only two instances in which the Supreme Court has found that Congress 
delegated excessive decision-making authority.116 
Congress is the exclusive federal lawmaking body is an oversimplification of constitutional reality-
not only the reality of today, in which administrative agencies churn out reams of edicts having the 
force of law, but also the reality presented by the Constitution itself."); Yoo, Politics as Law, supra 
note 15, at 869 ("Clearly, the Constitution does not establish a pure separation of powers in which each 
branch solely exercises all functions peculiar to it."). 
110. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (concurring in a conclusion that President Truman exceeded his executive powers by 
seizing steel miiis during the Korean War); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693-94 (1988) 
("[W]e have never held that the Constitution requires that the three branches of Government "operate 
with absolute independence." (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974))). 
11 I. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996) (stating that the Court had 
"established long ago that Congress must be permitted to delegate to others at least some authority that 
it could exercise itself'); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) ("Congress does not violate 
the Constitution merely because it legislates in broad terms, leaving a certain degree of discretion to 
executive or judicial actors."). 
112. 488 u.s. 361 (1989). 
113. /d. at 372. 
114. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (observing that because 
Article I, Section I, of the Constitution vests its legislative powers in Congress, it ''permits no 
delegation of those powers" (citing Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996))). Instead, a 
valid delegation of decision-making authority requires that Congress "lay down by legislative act an 
inteiiigible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform." /d. at 472 
(quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)); see also Mistretta, 488 
U.S. at 379 (observing that the nondelegation doctrine requires only that Congress provide sufficient 
guidance to permit a court "to ascertain whether the wiii of Congress has been obeyed" (quoting Y akus 
v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,425-26 (1944))). 
115. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474 (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
116. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining 
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). The Court in Whitman stated: 
In the history of the Court we have found the requisite "inteiiigible principle" lacking in only 
two statutes, one of which provided literaiiy no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and 
the other of which conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more 
precise a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring "fair competition." 
Whitman, 531 U.S at 474 (citing the Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry cases). 
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The traditional recipients of congressional delegations of decision-
making authority have been executive-branch agencies. This does not nec-
essarily mean that the Constitution also permits the exercise of similar 
decision-making powers by the federal courts.117 Indeed, at least since Erie 
R.R. v. Tompkins, 118 the constitutional premise of a federal government of 
limited, specifically enumerated powers has been understood as also pro-
hibiting federal courts from exercising general common-law-making pow-
ers, 119 except in narrow circumstances. 120 The result of these federalism 
concerns is that, unlike their state counterparts, federal courts "do not 
possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules of 
decision. "121 
Like administrative agencies, however, federal courts may obtain the 
authority to develop the law through a delegation from Congress. For 
nearly fifty years, the Supreme Court has recognized that within proper 
limits, Congress may confer on the federal courts the power to develop the 
law within the scope of a statute in common-law fashion. In other words, 
although the federal courts do not inherently have such powers, they may 
exercise decision-making authority when "Congress has given [them] the 
power to develop substantive law."122 
This power of decision-making authority delegated by Congress 
traces its formal lineage to the Supreme Court's opinion in Textile Workers 
117. See Merrill, supra note 109, at 21 (noting that "the fact that the Constitution pennits some 
sharing of the lawmaking power with the executive branch does not require us to conclude that the 
Constitution erects a system of shared powers with respect to lawmaking by the federal courts"). 
118. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). There are indications as early as 1834 of a recognition by the 
Supreme Court that the Constitution places limits on the common-law powers of federal courts. See 
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834) ("It is clear, there can be no common Jaw of the 
United States."). 
119. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) 
(emphasizing with regard to common-law powers that "the federal lawmaking power is vested in the 
legislative, not the judicial, branch of government"); see also Merrill, supra note 109, at 13 (explaining 
on the same issue that "[a]s the general structure of the Constitution and the tenth amendment make 
clear, the framers anticipated that the federal government would exercise only specifically enumerated 
powers"). 
120. Absent congressional authorization, federal common law is limited to those cases in which 
there is a "significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law." 
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 
384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)); see also Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) 
(observing that "absent some congressional authorization to fonnulate substantive rules of decision, 
federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations 
of the United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States or 
our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases"). 
121. City ofMilwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,312 (1981). 
122. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640; see also Merrill, supra note 109, at 40 (describing such an 
authority of the federal courts as "delegated lawmaking" and observing that it "takes place when 
Congress ... confer[ s] power on the federal courts to fashion federal rules of decision in order to round 
out or complete a ... statutory scheme"). 
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Union v. Lincoln Mills. 123 Decided in the shadow of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 
the Court in Lincoln Mills faced an absence of congressional guidance in 
the Labor Management Relations Act124 on the proper enforcement of col-
lective bargaining agreements. After examining the Act's legislative his-
tory, the Court found that a single provision, Section 304(a), reflected an 
implied congressional determination to "authorize[] federal courts to 
fashion a body of federal law" regarding the enforcement of such agree-
ments.125 Although some have questioned the factual foundation for this 
specific conclusion, 126 the decision in Lincoln Mills confirmed that 
Congress has the power to delegate to the federal courts the authority to 
develop the law within the scope of a legislative enactment. 127 
Contrary to Professor Yoo's suggestion in his Rejoinder to this Essay, 
Lincoln Mills is not an isolated anomaly.128 Since that case, federal courts 
have found on a number of occasions that Congress either expressly or im-
pliedly129 delegated authority to the federal courts to develop the law 
within the scope of a statute. The most prominent example of express dele-
gation may be Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which addresses 
the issue of testimonial privilege.130 In spite of the policy-laden nature of 
this issue, in Rule 501, unlike in other provisions in the Federal Rules, 
Congress simply instructed that such privileges are to be "governed by the 
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of 
the United States in the light of reason and experience."131 Instead of un-
dertaking a detailed legislative prescription, therefore, Congress expressly 
conferred on the federal courts the power to develop the law in this area in 
a common-law fashion. 132 
123. 353 u.s. 448 (1957). 
124. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1947). 
125. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 451. 
126. Justice Frankfurter, for example, strongly objected in his dissent in Lincoln Mills to the 
majority's reliance on the limited legislative histocy of the Labor Management Relations Act to support 
its conclusion. See id. at 460-64 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
127. See also Merrill, supra note 109, at 40-41 (concluding that Lincoln Mills "is generally taken 
to have established the principle that it is within the power of Congress to delegate lawmaking power to 
the federal courts"); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. 
L. REv. 883, 893-99 (1986) (describing the foundations for the exercise of common-law powers by 
federal courts). 
128. See John Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 
1305, 1329 (2002). 
129. See Merrill, supra note 109, at 42 (observing with regard to the common-law powers of 
federal courts that"( d]elegated powers oflawmaking can be either express or implied"). I discuss these 
instances of congressional delegation to the courts infra notes 130-38 and accompanying text. 
130. See FED. R. Evm. 501. 
131. ld. See also Merrill, supra note 109, at 42 (observing that the "intent to delegate [in Rule 501] 
is unmistakable"); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (noting that in the drafting of Rule 
501 Congress rejected a more detailed proposal in favor of Rule 501 's general mandate to federal 
courts to develop the law based on common-law principles). 
132. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. I, 8-9 (1996) (noting the instruction in Rule 501 that courts 
are to develop testimonial privileges based on common-law principles and stating that the rule "did not 
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The Sherman Anti-Trust Act provides the paradigmatic example of an 
implied delegation of common-law-making powers. 133 Given the broad 
language in Sections One and Two of that Act, 134 the Supreme Court has 
often found that Congress in effect delegated to the federal courts the 
authority to develop the law within the Act's scope "by drawing on 
common-law tradition."135 Even Justice Scalia has aclmowledged that the 
broad "restraint of trade" term in the Sherman Act contemplates a 
"dynamic" development of the law by the courts, one that "invokes the 
common law itself."136 Other instances properly viewed as implied delega-
tions of decision-making authority include Section 1 O(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934137 and the fiduciary responsibility provisions of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act. 138 
freeze the law governing the privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a particular point in our history, 
but rather directed federal courts to 'continue the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges"' 
(quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980))). 
133. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
134. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000). 
135. Nat'! Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). For more detailed 
examinations of the implied delegation of lawmaking authority in the Sherman Act, see Merrill, supra 
note 109, at 44-46; William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the 
"Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEx. L. REv. 661, 662-73 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEx. L. REv. 705, 706 (1982); see also Sunstein, supra note 
18, at 421 (observing that the Supreme Court has interpreted the Sherman Act "as a delegation of 
policymaking power pursuant to quite open-ended criteria"). 
136. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) ("The Sherman Act 
adopted the term 'restraint of trade' along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law itself, 
and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890."); see also 
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997) (observing that "the general presumption that 
legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of 
the accepted view that Congress 'expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by 
drawing on common-law tradition"' (quoting Nat 'I Soc 'y of Prof/ Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 688)). 
137. IS U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2001). In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drugstores, the Court declared: 
When we deal with private actions under rule I Ob-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has 
grown from little more than a legislative acorn. Such growth may be quite consistent with the 
Congressional enactment and with the role of the federal judiciary in interpreting it ... but it 
would be disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in 1942 foreordained the present state of the law with respect to Rule 
!Ob-5. 
421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). Cf. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 
293-98 (1993) (holding that the formulation of the contours of Rule I Ob-5 actions is a "task ... [that] 
Congress has left to us" and that the goal in exercising that authority is to determine how Congress 
would have resolved the particular issue in dispute). See also Merrill, supra note 109, at 45 n.l98 
(observing that "[a]nother prominent example of implied delegated lawmaking is the jurisprudence of 
'deceptive and manipulative' practices that has emerged under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934"). 
138. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-14 (Supp. V 1999) ("ERISA"); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, llO-ll (1989) (observing that in light of the text and legislative history of 
ERISA, "we have held that courts are to develop a 'federal common law of rights and obligations under 
ERISA-regulated plans'" (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987))). Another 
example of delegated authority to create federal common law is the Federal Employers' Liability Act 
("FELA"). See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 558 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) 
(observing that the duty of federal courts "in interpreting FELA ... is to develop a federal common law 
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Indeed, sound arguments support a presumption of implied delegated 
authority whenever Congress legislates in the form of broad standards. 139 
As the Supreme Court observed in Touby v. United States, 140 "Congress 
does not violate the Constitution merely because it legislates in broad 
terms, leaving a certain degree of discretion to ... judicial actors."141 
Commentators have argued on this basis that Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964142 and Section 1983143 likewise reflect instances of congres-
sional delegation of decision-making authority to the federal courts. 144 
Not all statutes, of course, bestow common-law powers on the federal 
courts, nor may Congress delegate the entirety of its legislative power on a 
given subject to the federal courts. In parallel with the restrictions of 
the nondelegation doctrine for other institutions, 145 a purported statutory 
of negligence ... infonned by reference to the evolving common Jaw"). Cf. Metro-North Commuter 
R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 429 (1997) (citing this observation of Justice Souter). 
139. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) ("Broadly 
worded ... statutory provisions necessarily have been given concrete meaning and application by a 
process of case-by-case judicial decision in the common Jaw tradition."); McNally v. United States, 483 
U.S. 350, 373 (1987) (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("The wide open spaces in statutes such as [The Shennan 
Act, The Civil Rights Acts, and the mail fraud statute] are most appropriately interpreted as implicit 
delegations of authority to the courts to fill in the gaps in the common-Jaw tradition of case-by-case 
adjudication."); see also Merrill, supra note 109, at 43-46 (arguing that when Congress legislates broad 
legal standards or adopts a legal standard that is borrowed from the common Jaw, there are "rebuttable 
presumptions" of delegated lawmaking). In some cases, it may be very difficult to detennine where 
"interpretation" in the narrow sense of detennining intended meaning ends and where the development 
of the Jaw in accordance with delegated authority begins. Interestingly, the Supreme Court recently has 
recognized a sort of middle ground for some statutory schemes, in which courts must apply "federal 
Jaw," but apparently not a fonn the court wishes to identify as "federal common Jaw." See Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754-55 (1998) (holding that "Congress has directed federal courts 
to interpret Title VII based on agency principles," but stating that "[t]his is not federal common Jaw in 
'the strictest sense, i.e., a rule of decision that amounts, not simply to an interpretation of a federal 
statute, but rather, to the judicial 'creation' of a special federal rule of decision"' (quoting Atherton v. 
FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997))); see also Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. 
L. REv. 895 (1996) (discussing the new class of federal Jaw in which federal courts refer to state 
common Jaw even when fonnal federal common Jaw does not govern a particular case). 
140. 500 u.s. 160 (1991). 
141. /d. at 165. 
142. See J. Hoult Verkerke, Note, Compensating Victims of Preferential Employment 
Discrimination Remedies, 98 YALE LJ. 1479, 1491 (1989) (stating that "Congress affinnatively 
delegated to federal courts the task of developing an equitable system of remedies" under Title VII); 
see also Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 966 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that in both Title 
VII and the Shennan Act "Congress has legislated in general tenns," and that both Acts thus require the 
courts to fonnulate their own theories of implementation). 
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1999). 
144. See Kit Kinports, The Buck Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in Section /983 
Cases, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 147, 157 (arguing that "Congress delegated to the federal courts the task of 
developing the Jaw" under Section 1983); Jack M. Beerrnann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with 
Special Attention to Sources ofLmv, 42 STAN. L. REv. 51, 88 & n.197 (1989) (arguing that Congress 
has delegated to the federal courts "broad discretion in interpretation" under Section 1983). 
145. This is particularly true of administrative agencies. See supra note 114 and accompanying 
text (citing Supreme Court authority to the effect that when delegating legislative powers Congress 
must establish an "intelligible principle" to guide the discretion of administrative agencies); see also 
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delegation must both reflect a congressional intent to confer developmental 
authority and reasonably mark out the boundaries within which the courts 
may exercise their discretion. 146 As Professor Thomas Merrill has correctly 
observed, if such a delegation satisfies these criteria, "it does not violate 
[constitutional] principles of federalism, separation of powers, or electoral 
accountability. " 147 
B. Treaty Delegation 
While there is no constitutional infirmity in a deliberate and circum-
scribed congressional delegation to the federal courts of a power to de-
velop the law within the scope of a statute, a question emerges whether 
similar delegation may occur through treaties. Professor Y oo suggests that 
the issues are separate and doubts the constitutional foundation for such a 
delegation of power in the treaty context.148 The short response to this chal-
lenge is that, like delegations under Article I statutes, the source of the 
enhanced federal-court interpretive authority under treaties is the constitu-
tionally empowered "treaty-lawmakers" themselves: the President and a 
supermajority of the Senate. In other words, the power to develop the law 
within the scope of a treaty arises not from an arrogation of authority by 
the courts, but rather from a circumscribed delegation by those with the 
constitutional power to create federal law through the vehicle of a treaty. 
From a formal perspective, the Constitution establishes that self-
executing treaties have the same domestic force and effect as Article I leg-
islation.149 The inclusion of treaties within the judicial power of federal 
courts in Article III likewise places them on an equal footing with legisla-
tive law. To be sure, the treaty-lawmakers retain the power to direct 
through the substance of a treaty that it will not at all create domestic law 
without implementing legislation by Congress.150 But when they choose to 
United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. Co., 282 U.S. 311, 324 (1931) 
("Congress cannot delegate any part of its legislative power except under the limitation of a prescribed 
standard .... "). 
146. See Merrill, supra note 109, at 41 (arguing, compellingly in my view, that Congress may 
delegate lawmaking authority to the courts if "the delegation is specifically intended and the area of 
delegation is reasonably circumscribed"). 
147. /d. As Professor Merrill also suggests, for reasons of electoral accountability and the absence 
of judicial review, it may be appropriate for Congress to give more guidance to the courts than 
administrative agencies. /d. at 41 n.l82 (noting also that "[i]t may also be that the test for assessing 
delegations to the executive branch is simply too lax"). This observation does not alter, however, the 
fundamental point that Congress has the power to delegate a circumscribed decision-making authority 
to the federal courts. 
148. See Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 879 n.85 (arguing that the delegation argument 
advanced in Dynamic Treaty Interpretation "suffers from [a] failure to identity any constitutional 
authorization for such an enormous transfer of power from the treatymakers to the courts"). 
149. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text. 
150. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (discussing the various reason why treaties 
may not be self-executing); see also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (when a treaty is in the 
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adopt self-executing treaties which create rights or obligations enforceable 
by individuals, the combined effect of Article VI and Article III is that the 
formal judicial power in relationship to the treaty is the same as that to 
Article I legislation.151 For this reason, the Supreme Court has declared that 
treaties are "equivalent to [acts] of the legislature,"152 that they have the 
"force and effect of ... legislative enactment[s],"153 and that they "partake 
of the nature of municipal law ... in the same category as other laws of 
Congress."154 
The formal judicial authority with regard to application and interpre-
tation of self-executing treaties likewise is fundamentally the same as it is 
with Article I legislation. Even at some of the earliest moments of our con-
stitutional history, some of the Founders expressly aclmowledged that the 
courts were responsible for interpretation of such treaties, just as they were 
with statutes. For example, Alexander Hamilton observed in Federalist No. 
22, "The treaties of the United States, as far as respects individuals, must 
like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations."155 The 
Supreme Court also early on confirmed that it possessed the final responsi-
bility for the interpretation of treaties. 156 In fulfillment of the directive in 
Marbury v. Madison that the judicial responsibility to apply the law in-
cludes the power to "expound and interpret" the law, 157 the Supreme Court 
nature of a mere contract addressed ''to the political, not the judicial department ..• the legislature must 
execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court''); Vazquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 
60, at 702 (observing that the Supreme Court's holding in Foster v. Neilson "recognize[d] that the 
general rule established by the Supremacy Clause, under which treaties are enforceable in the courts 
without prior legislative action, is one that may be altered by the parties to the treaty through the treaty 
itself'). 
151. This does not mean that the deference accorded the lawmakers under treaties and statutes in 
all cases must be the same. For prudential reasons, courts may properly give deference to the view of 
the executive in the application and interpretation of some treaties. As I explain below, however, this 
deference is not an unthinking, absolute one, but rather must be calibrated to the nature of the specific 
treaty at issue. See infra notes 223-42 and accompanying text. 
152. Foster, 27 U.S. at 314. 
153. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). 
154. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884). 
155. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 150 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). A similar 
observation was made by an opponent of the broad power of the judiciary over treaties. ''Brutus" 
criticized the inclusion of treaties as "the law of the land" because "every person who have rights or 
privileges secured by treaty, will have aid of the courts of law, in recovering them." See "Brutus Xlll", 
in NEW YORK JOURNAL, 21 February, 1788, reprinted in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 172 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986). I cite 
these quotations only for purposes of background to the Supreme Court doctrine in the discussion to 
follow. As I have noted above, the historical background to the treaty power already has been examined 
exhaustively, and at best inconclusively, by Professor Yoo, and his arguments in turn have been 
challenged in equal detail by other scholars. See supra note 69 (citing the authority on this historical 
debate). 
156. See, e.g., Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 620-27 (1813) 
(holding that it had the final authority to determine whether state law violated the terms of a treaty); 
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199,283 (1796). 
157. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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has explicitly found that it has the constitutional authority to interpret trea-
ties.158 
The Court's first major treaty decision, Ware v. Hylton, 159 provides a 
good example. The case addressed the effect of the Supremacy Clause on 
state laws that were contrary to the terms of the 1783 Treaty of Peace with 
Great Britain. The fourth article of that treaty provided that private credi-
tors "shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of ... debts."160 
Justice Chase, who offered the most detailed opinion on the effect of the 
Supremacy Clause, found that if an individual creditor "prosecuted his just 
right, it could only be in a court of justice, and if any [state laws] were set 
up as a lawful impediment, the courts were bound to decide, whether this 
article of the treaty nullified the laws .... " 161 With regard to the interpre-
tive authority of the judiciary, Justice Chase then concluded that "the 
courts, in which the cases arose, were the only proper authority to decide, 
whether the case was within this article of the treaty, and the operation and 
effect ofit."162 
For those treaty provisions that create rights enforceable by individu-
als, then, the federal courts have the same formal constitutional power to 
apply and interpret the law as they do with Article I statutes.163 As we have 
seen in the statutory context, within proper limits, 164 the constitutional in-
stitutions with the authority to create Article I federal law (the Congress 
either with the cooperation, or over the veto, of the President) have the 
power to delegate to the federal courts the authority to develop the substan-
tive law within the scope of a statute. Just as with the formally equivalent 
creation of Article I federal law, the treaty-lawmakers should have the 
power to delegate enhanced interpretive powers to the federal judiciary.165 
158. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (holding 
that ''the courts have the authority to construe treaties" (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 1986 (1969))). 
159. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
160. The Defmitive Treaty of Peace Between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of 
America, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 4, reprinted in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1818, at 151, 154 (Hunter Miller, ed., 1931). 
161. Ware, 3 U.S. at 239. 
162. Id. 
163. Even the Rules of Decision Act makes clear that treaty law, like acts of Congress, can 
"require or provide" rules of decision that displace state substantive law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2001) 
("The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts 
of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the 
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."). But see Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 
559 (1923) (concluding that the Rules of Decision Act is "merely declarative of the rule which would 
exist in the absence of the statute"). See also Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. 410, 439 (1838) ("Treaties are 
the law of the land, and a rule of decision in all courts."). 
164. See supra notes 122-47 and accompanying text. 
165. See also Field, supra note 127, at 889 (arguing that "the process and standards for making 
federal common law are the same when a treaty ... is the source of authority"); Louis HENKIN, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 470 n.83 (2d ed. 1996) (concluding that "[i]t has been 
assumed that constitutional limitations on delegation oflegislative power apply as well to delegation by 
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But they may do so only within the confines of the separation of powers, 
federalism, and political accountability concerns that have animated the 
Supreme Court's nondelegation jurisprudence for statutory delegations. 166 
In the treaty context, these constraints will require that the exercise of 
decision-making authority by the courts likewise proceed from an inten-
tional and circumscribed delegation of authority by the constitutional insti-
tutions empowered to create federal law through the vehicle of a treaty (the 
President, with the consent of a supermajority of the Senate ).167 Save for 
those questions of uniquely national interest, 168 federal courts will not have 
common-law developmental powers under a treaty of their own accord, 169 
even on matters with international connections. But if the treaty-lawmakers 
both intend a delegation and reasonably frame its limits, then the exercise 
of such powers by the federal courts will originate only from a deliberate 
authorization by electorally accountable institutions. These constraints will 
also ensure, as in the parallel statutory context, that the exercise of dele-
gated authority does not represent an unconstitutional arrogation by federal 
courts of powers allocated to the other branches of government. 
Indeed, the concerns about the delegation of common-law powers to 
federal courts may be even less convincing in the treaty context. The prin-
cipal concern that spawned the Erie limitation on the common-law powers 
of federal courts was one of federalism. 170 In contrast to most areas of 
Article I legislation, however, the power to create treaties is exclusively 
a federal one, for the Constitution expressly forbids states from creating 
law by that means. 171 And, although the issue recently has become more 
controversial, 172 the Supreme Court has long held that the treaty power 
granted to the federal government by the Constitution is plenary in scope, 
treaty"); Golove, supra note 13, at 1286 n.717 (asserting that "treaties are alternative modes of 
promulgating laws and, hence, ought presumptively to be subject to the same restrictions on 
delegations to which the identical laws would be subject"). 
166. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (describing the limitations on statutory 
delegation). 
167. See id. (describing these limitations); see also Merrill, supra note 109, at 19-24 (describing 
the separation of powers limitations on federal common law). 
168. An example is core matters of international relations, such as the Act of State Doctrine. See 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,423-27 (1964) (holding that federal common law 
in this area is "necessary to protect uniquely federal interests"). 
169. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEx. L. REv. 
1321, 1412-19 (2001) (observing that the limitations on federal common law reflect the idea that "the 
Constitution constrains ... the manner in which the federal government may exercise [its delegated] 
powers to displace state law"); Merrill, supra note 109, at 13-19 (describing the federalism limitations 
on federal common law). 
170. See Merrill, supra note 109, at 13 (observing that federalism ''was the key principle invoked 
in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins''). 
171. See U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 10 (providing that "[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, 
or Confederation"). 
172. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (describing the controversy over whether there are 
any substantive limits on the scope of the treaty power). 
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subject only to the more specific constitutional protections such as those 
found in the Bill of Rights. 173 But within these (admittedly important) 
constraints, a delegation of authority to develop the law under a treaty does 
not violate the federalism principles that limit the common-law powers of 
federal courts. 
The only Supreme Court opinion that has directly addressed this issue 
fully comports with this reasoning. In Zicherman v. Korean Airlines, 
Co., 174 an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court addressed how it 
should fill a particular regulatory gap in the Warsaw Convention on air 
transportation. 175 It ultimately decided that resolution of this issue required 
the Court to apply otherwise-applicable domestic law. 176 But it only did so 
after finding as a factual matter that the treaty did not "empower 
[the Court] to develop some common-law rule-under cover of general 
admiralty law or otherwise-that will supersede the normal federal 
disposition."177 That is, the Court did not question that the treaty-
lawmakers have the authority to empower federal courts to develop the law 
under a treaty; it merely held that they factually had not done so in that 
case. 178 
In contrast to the treaty at issue in Zicherman, the private-law conven-
tions I analyzed in Dynamic Treaty Interpretation expressly empower the 
courts to develop federal common law. 179 Specifically, I examined the 
interpretive principles expressly prescribed in the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,' 80 a 
173. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that the federal government could 
exercise by treaty even powers that are denied Congress under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution); 
see also Golove, supra note 13, at 1257-66 (describing Missouri v. Holland in more detail and 
defending its conclusion); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I, 16-18 (1957) (holding that a treaty may not 
contravene specific provisions of the Constitution). 
174. 516 u.s. 217 (1996). 
175. Jd.at218-19. 
176. !d. at 226-28. 
177. !d. at 229. Subsequent federal courts decisions have followed Zicherman without expressly 
addressing whether a treaty may delegate lawmaking authority. See Ins. Co. ofN. Am. v. Fed. Express 
Corp., 189 F.3d 914, 920-21 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Zicherman as support for a decision to "refrain 
from fashioning a federal common law meaning to the term willful misconduct" under the Warsaw 
Convention); Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d I, 9 (2d Cir. 1996) (refusing to fill a 
gap in the Warsaw Convention because it "does not authorize federal common law"). 
178. Zicherman, 516 U.S. at229. 
179. Even at the time of the submittal of this treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent, it was 
the clear understanding of the executive branch that the courts would apply the U.N. Sales Convention. 
See Letter of Transmittal from the President of the United States to the Senate With Legal Analysis of 
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Sept. 21, 1983, SEN. 
TREATY Doc. No. 98-9, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1368, 1369 (1983) (containing a statement by the 
secretary of state that "[t]he Convention ... is self-executing and thus requires no federal implementing 
legislation to come into force throughout the United States"); id. at 1371 (referring to the application of 
the Convention "by American courts"). 
180. See CISG, supra note 7. The official, English-language version is also reprinted at 52 FED. 
REG. 6264 (1987). 
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self-executing treaty ratified by the United States in 1986.181 As I explained 
there, Article 7(2) of that treaty, which has since become the paradigm for 
other, yet unratified treaties, 182 expressly authorizes the courts to fill gaps 
that arise in its regulatory scheme.183 Specifically, Article 7(2) provides 
that "[ q]uestions ... not expressly settled" in the Convention "are to be 
settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based."184 
Neither the treaty itself nor its drafting history identifies these "general 
principles," however.185 Thus, the delegation of the power to fill gaps in the 
treaty as they emerge over time necessarily contemplates an active role by 
the courts in the development of the law.186 
181. The U.S. Senate gave its consent to the U.N. Sales Convention in accordance with Article II, 
Section 2 in October, 1986, and the United States deposited the ratification with the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") on December lith of the same year. For 
more details on the history of the ratification of this treaty, see Peter Winship, Congress and the 1980 
International Sales Convention, 16 GA. J. lNT'L AND CoMP. L. 707, 708-10 (1986). The U.N. Sales 
Convention entered into effect in accordance with its terms on January 1, 1988, upon the ratification by 
ten nations. See CISG, supra note 7, art. 99(1 ). A complete list of the present member states to the U.N. 
Sales Convention is published periodically by UNCITRAL. Status of Conventions, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm (last visited May 1, 2002). 
182. See UNIDROIT Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods, Feb. 17, 1983, 
reprinted in 22 l.L.M. 249 ("Convention on Agency"); UNIDROIT Convention on International 
Financial Leasing, May 28, 1988, reprinted in 27 l.L.M. 931 ("Convention on Financial Leasing"); 
UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring, May 28, 1988, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 943 
("Convention on Factoring"); UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, 
reprinted in 39 l.L.M. 966 (2000) ("Convention on Security Interests"). For more information on these 
and other UNIDROIT conventions, see the UNIDROIT homepage at http://www.unidroit.org. See also 
United Nations Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, 
Dec. 9, 1988, reprinted in 28 l.L.M. 170; United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and 
Stand-by Letters of Credit, Dec. 11, 1995, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 735. Information on these and the 
other projects of UNCITRAL can be found on the UNCITRAL homepage, 
http://www.un.or.at/uncitraV (last visited May 1, 2002). 
183. See Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 733-34. 
184. See CISG, supra note 7, art. 7(2). See also Convention on Financial Leasing, supra note 182, 
art. 6(2); Convention on Factoring, supra note 182, art. 4(2); Convention on Agency, supra note 182, 
art. 6(2); Convention on Security Interests, supra note 182, art. 6(2). 
185. I will not reexamine in detail here the specific means by which the general-principles 
methodology functions both to fill gaps (both "open" and "hidden") in a treaty and to otherwise permit 
a dynamic interpretation of the law within the scope of the U.N. Sales Convention. This more detailed 
analysis can be found in Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 761-91. Article 7(2) permits a court to resort to 
domestic law only if an active search for the relevant general principles under the treaty yields no 
results. But see id. at 791 (arguing that because of a separate instruction to interpreters to advance 
interests of international uniformity, courts should only rarely resort to this provision and apply 
domestic law). 
186. Separately, the general-principles methodology also addresses the debate over the propriety 
of strict textualist approaches to matters of interpretation. As I explained in Dynamic Treaty 
Interpretation, a requirement that interpreters probe undefmed general principles in matters of 
interpretation contemplates enhanced consideration of the drafting history of the Convention. See Van 
Alstine, supra note 16, at 743-53. Moreover, as was the case with the U.N. Sales Convention, the 
institutional process for the drafting of most multilateral private-law conventions involves the creation 
of detailed records of the drafting process, records that are available long before Senate consideration 
of the treaty. Indeed, the President emphasized the availability of drafting records in recommending the 
Senate's consent to the U.N. Sales Convention. See Letter of Submittal from George P. Schultz to 
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As I argued in Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, by consenting to and 
ratifying this general-principles methodology, the Senate and President act 
through their joint power as constitutional treaty-lawmakers to give "the 
courts the power to develop substantive law."187 This delegation through 
the vehicle of a treaty thus parallels the express statutory delegation of au-
thority in Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the implied dele-
gations sanctioned by the Supreme Court for the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 
Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, and other legisla-
tive enactments. 188 Moreover, the Convention carefully marks out the 
boundaries within which courts may exercise their discretion. This specific 
delegation of developmental powers to the federal courts satisfies federal-
ism and separation of powers concerns that limit federal common law by 
defining its sphere of application 189 and expressly instructing that the dele-
gated authority to fill regulatory gaps only extends to those matters within 
that scope. 190 In addition, the exercise of this delegated authority may only 
proceed on the basis of the "general principles" reflected in the substance 
of the treaty adopted by the treaty-lawmakers themselves. 
As in the statutory context, a delegation of decision-making authority 
under a treaty also may occur in an implied fashion. The U.N. Sales 
Convention, for example, also contains (beyond its express delegation) a 
number of broad, indefinite terms, 191 which by their very nature involve the 
exercise of judicial discretion as they are applied and given functional con-
tent over time. 192 Moreover, an implied authorization to develop federal 
Ronald Reagan, Aug. 30, 1983, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1368, 1369 (1983) (emphasizing that "[t]he 
legislative histozy of the Convention is readily available in English"); Message from the President 
Transmitting the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
reprinted in 221.L.M. 1368 (1983) (same). 
187. See Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 756 (quoting Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 
451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)); see also Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations 
Conventions on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. LJ. 265, 299 (1984) 
(concluding that CISG "[a ]rticle 7 seems to express the wish that the broad terms of the Convention be 
filled in over time by a world common law, a shared body of interpretation that would supply a gloss 
on the text," but lamenting a supposed absence of sufficient express guidance for the process). 
188. See supra notes 123-38 and accompanying text. 
189. See CISG, supra note 7, art. I (stating that the Convention applies to sale-of-goods 
transactions that satisfY certain internationality requirements); see also id. art. 2 (excluding certain 
classes of transactions that otherwise would fall within the scope of the Convention). 
190. See id. art. 7(2) (providing that the authority to fill gaps only extends to matters "governed by 
the Convention"). Even for matters within the scope of the Convention, examination of text, context, 
and drafting histozy may reveal an affirmative decision by the treatymakers to reject a particular 
normative solution for an ostensibly unresolved issue. For more on this point, see Van Alstine, supra 
note 16, at 767-68. 
191. An illustration of this point under the U.N. Sales Convention is the concept of 
"reasonableness." In over thirty separate provisions, the Convention defines rights or obligations with 
reference to what is "reasonable" or "unreasonable," but it nowhere defines those terms. For more on 
this point, see Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 751-52. 
192. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text (discussing the implied delegation of 
decision-making authority that arises when Congress legislates in the form of broad standards). 
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common law may flow from a direction to the courts to ensure uniformity 
in the application of a treaty.193 While general interests of federal 
uniformity alone may be insufficient, 194 an instruction from the constitu-
tionallawmakers to the same effect (such as the one set forth in a separate 
provision of tlie U.N. Sales Convention and its progeny)l95 should be 
viewed as an explicit authorization to develop federal common law to en-
sure national uniformity for interpretive matters within the scope of a 
treaty.196 
As Dynamic Treaty Interpretation argued, such an instruction to pro-
mote uniformity also implies that federal courts must consider interpretive 
court opinions in other member states. 197 This does not create separate 
constitutional concerns, however. 198 A decision to afford mandatory prece-
dential effect to foreign court opinions may present an issue worthy of 
more detailed analysis. But a simple instruction that courts in this country 
should give appropriate deference to other member-state court opinions in 
the interests of uniformity merely makes express what the Supreme Court 
already has found to be a prudential consideration in matters of treaty in-
terpretation.199 
193. Cf. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) (observing that those 
federal programs that "'by their nature are and must be uniform in character throughout the Nation' 
necessitate formulation of controlling federal rules" (quoting United States v. Yazell, 383 U.S. 341, 354 
(1966))). 
194. See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. 
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
195. See, e.g., CISG, supra note 7, art. 7(1) (providing that interpreters of the convention must 
have regard for "the need to promote uniformity in its application"); Convention on Factoring, supra 
note 182, art. 4(1) (same); Draft Convention on Receivables Financing, supra note 182, art. 8(1) 
(same); Draft Convention on Security Interests, supra note 182, art. 6(1) (same). 
196. Justice Scalia's opinion in Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co. once again provides a good 
contrast There, the Supreme Court refused to fill a gap in the Warsaw Convention in the form of a rule 
of federal common law, but only after it first concluded as a factual matter that the treaty did not 
"authorizeD national courts to pursue uniformity in derogation of otherwise applicable law." 
Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 231. Even in matters (such as commercial law) traditionally reserved to the 
states, such an express direction to pursue international uniformity also overcomes the reluctance of the 
Supreme Court to find a federal preemption of state law. See Asante Techs., Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 
164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147-52 (2001) (holding that the uniformity directive in the U.N. Sales 
Convention evidences an intent by the treaty-lawmakers to preempt state law causes of action for 
matters within its scope); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 494 (1996) (citing a 
"presumption against pre-emption"); New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (same); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 
230 (1947) (holding that when Congress legislates in a field traditionally regulated by the states, courts 
should "start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded 
by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress"). 
197. See Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 787-91. 
198. See Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 879 n.85 (questioning the propriety of this 
argument as advanced in Dynamic Treaty Interpretation). 
199. See E1 Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175 (1999) (citing to 
"decisions of the courts of other Convention signatories" to "corroborate" the Court's interpretation of 
the Warsaw Convention on air transportation); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985) (stating 
with regard to treaty interpretation that "the opinions of our sister signatories are to be entitled to 
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A deliberate and circumscribed delegation to federal courts of an au-
thority to develop the law within the scope of a self-executing treaty is 
fully consistent with the structure of the Constitution. Such a delegation 
indeed involves a transfer to the courts of certain powers that the President 
and Senate could exercise directly.200 Parallel to statutory delegation, how-
ever, the exercise of these common-law powers does not reflect a unilateral 
encroachment by the federal courts on powers allocated to other branches, 
but rather it flows from an intentional and limited transfer by the constitu-
tional treaty-lawmakers themselves. And in this context as well, there are 
sound reasons for the Supreme Court to conclude, as it has with statutory 
delegations, that it should not "second-guess" these constitutional lawmak-
ers "regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to 
those ... applying the law."201 Indeed, this observation is consistent with 
the Court's long-standing jurisprudence, which is equally applicable in the 
treaty context, that "[w]hen any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising 
the power the Constitution has delegated to it."202 
The preeminent role of the executive in foreign policy matters prop-
erly will influence judicial decision-making in the development of the law 
under some treaties in some circumstances. This prudential consideration 
does not, however, undermine the formal constitutional foundation for a 
circumscribed delegation of power under a treaty. Rather, as we shall ex-
amine in more detail in Part III, it merely relates to the degree to which the 
courts should show deference to the views of the executive branch in the 
situational exercise of that power. 
III 
THE TREATY POWER AND DEFERENCE TO THE EXECUTIVE 
The difficulty with much of the commentary on the role of treaties in 
our constitutional system is the tendency to view all of them as fundamen-
tally the same. As a result, compelling analyses on narrow subjects often 
dissolve in their express or implied extrapolation. One prominent example 
of this phenomenon is the common assertion that foreign-policy concerns 
require that courts defer to the executive branch in all matters of treaty 
considerable weight" (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 919 (1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979))); see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 
93, § 325, cmt. d ("Treaties that lay down rules to be enforced by the parties through their internal 
courts or administrative agencies should be construed so as to achieve uniformity of result despite 
differences between national legal systems."). 
200. See Y oo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 879 n.85 (questioning the constitutionality of 
treaty delegations of federal common-law authority because it would involve an "enormous transfer" of 
power from the treatymakers to the courts). 
201. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 
115-16 and accompanying text (examining this observation in the statutory context). 
202. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,951 (1983). 
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interpretation.2°3 This is an important point for the analysis here; for, if the 
executive foreign-affairs powers in Article II somehow radiate to Article 
III and neutralize the judicial power to interpret the law under treaties, 
there may be little functional value to a formal delegation of developmen-
tal authority to the courts. As we shall see, however, the executive's role in 
foreign affairs varies in importance according to the type of treaty in-
volved. Furthermore, the Constitution itself suggests that the executive's 
control in this area is not absolute. 
A. The Executive's Role in Foreign Policy 
It is certainly correct that the President has primary responsibility over 
the international conduct of the United States as a sovereign entity. As 
Professor Y oo correctly observes, both the text and the drafting history of 
Article II contemplate that the executive branch would be the primary in-
stitution in carrying out the nation's foreign affairs.204 And, of course, the 
initiation of treaties is within the power of the President, subject to Senate 
consent. Moreover, the exigencies of national defense, the delicacy of in-
ternational diplomacy, and the need in many circumstances for a unitary 
voice in foreign relations create strong functionalist arguments for afford-
ing substantial discretion to the President on such issues.205 
The President's authority in matters of foreign policy is not absolute, 
however. The Senate also plays an integral role in shaping foreign policy, 
through its advice and consent to the ratification of treaties.206 Moreover, 
the Constitution expressly grants to Congress the powers to declare war,207 
to regulate foreign commerce,208 and to define offenses against interna-
tionallaw,209 as well as the ultimate authority, under its spending power/10 
203. See Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 873-75. 
204. See id. at 873-77. 
205. See Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 870-77; see also id. at 872 (advancing the 
functionalist argument that the Framers granted extensive authority to the executive in matters of 
foreign affairs "[b)ecause of the unitary Executive's perceived superiority to other approaches for 
addressing the dangers of the international world .... "); id. ("In this vast ex1emal realm, with its 
important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or 
listen as a representative of the nation." (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 
304,319 (1936))). 
206. See Arthur Bestor, "Advice" From the Very Beginning, "Consent" When the End Is 
Achieved, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 718, 725 (1989) (arguing after an extensive review of its constitutional 
drafting history that Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, "represents a continuing constitutional recognition 
of the Senate's inescapable and indefeasible responsibility-even though now a shared responsibility-
tor determining the foreign policy of the nation"). 
207. U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 11 (granting to Congress the power "[t]o declare War, grant Letters 
ofMarque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water''). 
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting to Congress the power "[t)o regulate Commerce with 
tbreign Nations"). 
209. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting to Congress the power "[t]o define and punish 
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law ofNations"). 
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to withhold funding for foreign activities with which it disagrees. In addi-
tion, Congress as a whole also may exercise general authority in this 
area through traditional Article I legislation, if necessary, by overriding a 
Presidential veto. Nor are powers expressly allocated to other constitutional 
institutions somehow transferred to the executive merely because they may 
affect foreign affairs. As we have seen, the Supreme Court has long con-
firmed that the determination of individual rights under treaties is 
fundamentally a judicial responsibility.211 More broadly, the Court has 
made clear that a matter's potential foreign-policy implications do not by 
themselves transform it into a political question. As it emphatically stated 
in its famous opinion on the subject in Baker v. Carr, "it is error to suppose 
that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond 
judicial cognizance."212 
On the specific issue of treaty interpretation, even the Rehnquist court 
has refused to accept assertions that executive interpretations bind the 
courts.213 In United States v. Alvarez-Machain,214 a highly politicized case 
in which the Court ultimately agreed with the President's interpretation, for 
example, the Court observed that if a treaty is self-executing, then "it 
would appear that a court must enforce it on behalf of an individual 
regardless of the offensiveness of the practice of one nation to the other."215 
In applying this conclusion, federal courts on a number of occasions have 
refused to accept the interpretation of a treaty asserted by executive-branch 
officials. 216 
210. U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 7 (providing that "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, 
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law"). 
211. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199,239 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.) (concluding 
with regard to the interpretation of a treaty provision that the courts ''were the only proper authority to 
decide, whether the case was within this article of the treaty, and the operation and effect of it"); see 
also supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text analyzing Supreme Court authority on the role of the 
judiciary in the treaty interpretation). 
212. 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); see also Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 
221,230 (1986). 
!d. 
We are cognizant of the interplay between [certain statutory provisions] and the conduct of 
this Nation's foreign relations, and we recognize the premier role which both Congress and 
the Executive play in this field. But under the Constitution, one of the Judiciary's 
characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely 
because our decision may have significant political overtones. 
213. See Bederman, supra note 16, at 1016 (concluding after an extensive analysis of the Court's 
treaty jurisprudence that "the Rehnquist Court has refused to accept the government's position that its 
interpretations of treaties are privileged and beyond judicial review"). 
214. 504 u.s. 655 (1992). 
215. 504 U.S. at 667; see also Vazquez, Treaty Rights, supra note 48, at 1131 ("It cannot be said 
that the Constitution allocates decisions of treaty issues generally to branches other than the 
judiciary."). 
216. As Professor Bederman has noted, in Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989), 
for example, the Court interpreted a treaty contrary to the position of the executive branch. See 
Bederman, supra note 16, at 1018; see also Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 335-42 (1939) (refusing to 
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Nonetheless, the Supreme Court on occasion has observed that the 
executive branch's interpretation of a treaty deserves some deference. In 
United States v. Stuart, for example, the Court repeated the common for-
mulation that "[a]lthough not conclusive," the interpretive views of the 
government agencies that have been charged with the negotiation and en-
forcement of a treaty are "entitled to great weight."217 Unfortunately, how-
ever, the Court has never offered a coherent explanation of the foundation 
for this deference, nor consistently adhered to it in practice.218 Moreover, 
woven among the rhetoric of deference is a tendency to approach matters 
of interpretation as if all treaties solely reflect a contract between sover-
eigns,219 even though the Supreme Court recognized as early as Foster v. 
Neilson that the Constitution rejected the mere "sovereign contract" view 
of all treaties. 220 The natural result of this inflexible conception of treaties 
has been enhanced deference to the executive branch. 
Concerns about foreign policy admittedly inject a complicating factor 
when determining the amount of deference to afford an executive interpre-
tation of a treaty. The difficulty with this point, however, is one of gener-
alization. Not all provisions of all treaties affect our nation's foreign affairs 
follow the executive branch's reinterpretation of a naturalization treaty); Valentine v. United States ex 
rei. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936) (disagreeing with a claim that the President had certain implied 
discretionary powers under an e,.,:tradition treaty); Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Dep't of the Navy, 686 
F. Supp. 354, 358-60 (D.D.C. 1988) (interpreting a treaty contrary to the view offered by the executive 
that it was not self-executing and thus created no rights enforceable by the plaintiff); REsTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 326, supra note 93, Reporters' note 2 (citing United States v. 
Decker, 600 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 855 (1979), and United States v. Enger, 
472 F. Supp. 490 (D.N.J. 1978)). 
217. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. 
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)); see also O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 33 (1986) 
(stating that executive application of a treaty is entitled to "great weight"). 
218. See Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 56, at 665 (observing that "critics have correctly 
noted that courts do not always defer when a case implicates foreign affairs; if 'foreign affairs' is the 
touchstone for deference, the case law looks incoherent''); see also supra note 216 (citing examples of 
where federal courts have not followed the interpretive views of the executive branch). 
219. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) (stating that treaties reflect "an 
agreement among sovereign powers"); see also Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United 
States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 533 (1987) ("In interpreting an international 
treaty, we are mindful that it is 'in the nature of a contract between nations."' (quoting Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253 (1984))); Washington v. Wash. Commercial 
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979) ("A treaty ... is essentially a contract 
between two sovereign nations."); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) (explaining that 
"treaties are contracts between independent nations"). The Supreme Court on occasion has stated that 
treaties should be interpreted more "liberally than private agreements." Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 
392, 396 (1985) (quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943)). 
See also E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. 
Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988). The precise import of this observation, however, is not at all clear. 
See Wolf, supra note 16, at 1068 (arguing that the norm that treaties should be interpreted "liberally 
and in good faith •.• may never have been the actual basis of a Supreme Court holding"). 
220. 27 U.S. 253, 314; see also supra notes 52-80 and accompanying text (analyzing the effect of 
this observation). 
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equally.221 Treaties addressing core national defense or diplomatic matters 
may intrinsically carry important foreign policy implications, for they most 
often only create rights and obligations of nations inter se. But other trea-
ties establish rights directly enforceable by private individuals that may 
affect foreign affairs only tangentially or episodically. And still others, as 
we have seen, do not involve rights or obligations of sovereign states at all; 
rather, they solely regulate the interaction between private actors.222 Only 
in the most attenuated or contorted definition of the term, or in the most 
extreme circumstances, will an interpretation of this latter class of treaties 
influence United States foreign policy at all. 
B. Calibrated Deference 
The variety of treaties and different degrees of executive involvement 
suggest that the proper approach to executive interpretations of treaties is 
one of calibrated deference. For diplomatic and national defense treaties, 
the deference due executive agencies properly may be substantial. In this 
context, as Professor Y oo convincingly argues, the executive branch may 
have significant structural advantages in both understanding the context of 
a treaty and giving practical meaning to its provisions.223 Indeed, as the 
institution in actual control of the day-to-day operation of those treaties, 
some level of executive interpretation simply is unavoidable.224 For such 
treaties, entrusting a specific executive-branch agency with the responsibil-
ity for the continuing administration of their provisions may reflect an im-
plicit delegation of enhanced interpretive discretion. 225 
221. As Louis Henkin has insightfully observed with regard to the general powers of the 
executive, "foreign affairs makes a difference." LoUIS HENKEN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED 
STATES CoNSTITUTION 132 (2d ed. 1996); see also Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 56, at 663-
67 (describing the importance of foreign affairs concerns in the Supreme Court's deference to the 
executive branch). 
222. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text. 
223. See Yoo, Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 870-77. 
224. See W. Michael Reisman, Necessary and Proper: Executive Competence to Interpret 
Treaties, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 316, 325-26 (1990) ("The issue is simply the competence to perform 
treaties internationally. If you cannot interpret, you cannot perform."); Eugene V. Rostow, The 
Reinterpretation Debate and Constitutional Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1451, 1457 (1989) ("The 
phenomenon of presidential interpretation and reinterpretation of treaties ... occurs daily in every nook 
and cranny of the law .... Sometimes the changes are incremental and interstitial. Sometimes they are 
considerable. They are in fact inevitable as law confronts life every day of the week."); see also Y oo, 
Politics as Law, supra note 15, at 874 ("Just as the President must interpret international law in the 
course of managing international relations, so too must the President interpret our treaties as part of the 
day-to-day execution of foreign affairs."). 
225. In the statutory context, the Supreme Court has made clear that Congress has wider latitude in 
delegating authority to executive-branch agencies in the foreign affairs arena. See Clinton v. City of 
New York, 524 U.S. 417,445 (1998) (drawing the same distinction with regard to the constitutionality 
of the Line-Item Veto Act); United States v. Curtis-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) 
(stating that in matters of foreign affairs the President has "a degree of discretion and freedom from 
statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved"); Field v. 
Clark, 143 U.S. 649,691 (1892). The Court observed that 
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Professor Curtis Bradley has suggested in this regard that the issue of 
deference to executive treaty interpretations might be resolved by analogy 
to the Supreme Court's Chevron doctrine.226 Under this doctrine, an ex-
press congressional delegation to an executive agency of administrative 
authority over a statute also carries an implied delegation of enhanced in-
terpretative powers.227 As a result, courts must defer to the agency's inter-
pretation as long as it is not contrary to the unambiguously expressed intent 
of Congress and is a "permissible" construction of the statute. 228 Professor 
Bradley suggests that the executive's preeminence in the matters of foreign 
affairs permits an implied delegation approach that parallels the Chevron 
doctrine.229 He thus argues that an analogy to the Chevron doctrine may 
both explain and frame the degree of deference due reasonable interpreta-
tions of treaties by those executive agencies charged with their administra-
tion and enforcement.230 
Even such an analogy to the Chevron doctrine carries an important 
internal limitation, however. In the statutory context, the Supreme Court in 
Chevron and its progeny has made clear that a deliberate congressional 
delegation of continuing administrative authority over a statutory field is a 
precondition to the enhanced judicial deference to agency interpretations of 
the statute.231 Even if one properly can extend the doctrine to the treaty 
context, therefore, an essential predicate for enhanced deference to execu-
tive interpretations is an entrustment of continuing administrative authority 
to a specific agency. A careful reading of Supreme Court rhetoric on treaty 
interpretation in fact reveals precisely such a requirement: when the Court 
has referred to deference to the executive branch it has consistently stated 
as a precondition that the interpretive views must be expressed "by the 
government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement."232 
!d. 
in the judgment of the legislative branch of the government, it is often desirable, if not 
essential for the protection of the interests of our people against the unfriendly or 
discriminating regulations established by foreign governments ... to invest the president with 
large discretion in matters arising out of the execution of statutes relating to trade and 
commerce with other nations 
226. See Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 56, at 701-07. 
227. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
228. /d. at 842-43. 
229. See Bradley, Chevron Deforence, supra note 56, at 667-75. 
230. !d. at 701-07. 
231. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) 
("Deference under Chevron to an agency's construction of a statute that it administers is premised on 
the theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to 
fill in the statutory gaps."); Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) ("A precondition to 
deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative authority."). 
232. See United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. 
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)). The Restatement of Foreign Relations overlooks this 
important qualification. Although it cites to the same Supreme Court authority, it inexplicably states 
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Even in the treaty context, this precondition for deference to executive 
agencies provides a significant limitation. Many treaties, in particular those 
that create individual rights, may provide only rare opportunities for 
administration by executive agencies.233 For those private-law treaties that 
only create rights enforceable by and against private entities/34 most often 
there will be no foundation for implied delegation of interpretive authority 
to the executive at all. Similarly, as the degree to which a treaty implicates 
foreign affairs concerns decreases, so too should the degree of deference to 
executive views about the meaning of its provisions. As with the commer-
cial law conventions discussed in Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, where a 
treaty involves no sovereign obligations and carries only the most attenu-
ated foreign-policy implications, the propriety of deference should dissolve 
almost entirely.235 In short, without an entrustment of continuing adminis-
trative authority to an executive-branch agency, what remains is a sliding-
scale deference calibrated to the overall persuasiveness of a proffered 
executive-branch interpretation of a treaty and to any implications for our 
nation's foreign affairs.236 
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the propriety of 
deference in El AI Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng237 is consistent 
with this reasoning. The case involved the interpretation of the private-law 
Warsaw Convention on air transportation. On the issue of deference, the 
Court once again cited the above authority that the views of those execu-
tive agencies that are charged with the enforcement of a treaty are entitled 
to great weight.238 But it also characterized the general proposition of def-
erence to executive interpretations in noticeably more careful, measured 
without express limitation that courts should afford "great weight to an interpretation made by the 
Executive Branch." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 93, § 326(2). 
233. See Bradley, Chevron Deference, supra note 56, at 706-07 (arguing that "Chevron deference 
concerning the meaning of a treaty" would not be absolute, but rather "be limited to situations where 
the executive branch entity has been charged with applying the treaty"). 
234. See Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 698-99 (describing the variety of private-law treaties that 
create only individual rights and obligations). 
235. Interestingly, the most prominent recent case in which the Supreme Court has not deferred to 
the executive dealt with interpretation of a treaty provision that governed solely the rights between 
private entities. See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989) (interpreting the express 
provisions of the Warsaw Convention on air transportation); see also Bederman, supra note 16, at 1018 
(noting that the Supreme Court interpreted the Warsaw Convention contrary to the view of the solicitor 
general, although the majority opinion in Chan does not mention this fact). 
236. This approach is also consistent with the Supreme Court's recent opinions on the propriety of 
deference to executive-branch interpretations of statutes where the Chevron doctrine does not apply. 
See Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEo. L.J. 833, 856-63 (2001) 
(arguing that recent Supreme Court precedent suggests that even when Chervon does not apply, federal 
courts should give deference to executive agency interpretations of statutes based on their overall 
persuasiveness) (citing and analyzing in this regard Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944)). 
237. 525 u.s. 155 (1999). 
238. 525 U.S. at 168 (citing and quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 
184-185 (1982)). 
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tones. The Court described the proper principle merely as one of "respect" 
for the executive, and it stated that this respect is only "ordinarily" due to 
the "reasonable" views of the executive branch concerning the meaning of 
a treaty.239 
Assertions that treaty law is fundamentally executive in nature (even 
if accepted) do not undermine this conclusion. In the parallel constitutional 
situation of Article I legislation, Congress is the preeminent decision-
making institution. Nonetheless, as we have seen/40 the Supreme Court has 
made clear that a subsequent Congress does not have the authority to inter-
pret earlier legislation without adhering to the full constitutional process 
for the creation of binding legal norms (that is, without passing a law 
signed by, or over the veto of, the President).Z41 In the same way, the opin-
ions of later executive-branch officials as to the meaning of an earlier self-
executing treaty are constitutionally suspect, for they also do not undergo 
the process prescribed in Article II for the creation of treaty law.242 
Finally, arguments founded on presumed executive expertise likewise 
do not justify anything more than calibrated deference. On delicate matters 
of international diplomacy and national defense, the structural advantages 
and resultant expertise of the executive may support substantial deference 
on treaty interpretation matters. For other treaties, however, there may 
be no reason to assume any special executive-branch expertise. The 
commercial law treaties analyzed in Dynamic Treaty Interpretation once 
again provide good examples. The subjects of these conventions are 
detailed matters of commercial law, such as the international sale of goods, 
receivables financing, and security interests in moveable equipment.243 
Experts in the respective fields draft such private-law treaties under the 
auspices of permanent international institutions, some of which are non-
governmental. 244 Indeed, this drafting process substantially parallels the 
239. !d. 
240. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying te:~.t 
241. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 (1968) (holding that 
the interpretive views of a later Congress are of"very little, if any, significance" (quoting Rainwater v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 590, 593 (1958)); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank 
of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994) (holding that an interpretation of Congress regarding the 
interpretation of an earlier statute "is of little assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute" 
(quoting Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989))). 
242. The Supreme Court has made the same observation with regard to subsequent Senate 
interpretations of earlier treaties. See Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 180 
(1901) ("The meaning ofthe treaty cannot be controlled by subsequent explanations of some ofthose 
who may have voted to ratifY it."). 
243. See, e.g., CISG, supra note 7, arts. 1-3; Convention on Financial Leasing, supra note 182, 
arts. 1-2; Convention on Factoring, supra note 182, arts. 1-2; Convention on Agency, supra note 182, 
art. 1; Convention on Security Interests, supra note 182, arts. 1-4. 
244. There are three principal institutions involved in the drafting of treaties in the field of private 
law. The first, a formal body that operates under the auspices of the United Nations, is UNCITRAL. 
For information on the workings of UNCITRAL in general, see John Honnold, The United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law: Mission and Methods, 27 AM. J. CaMP. L. 201 (1979). The 
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processes for drafting many domestic commercial law statutes.245 Although 
representatives of the State Department also oversee the process/46 private 
experts, generally law professors, are often the principal representatives of 
the United States in the drafting of the substantive provisions of these 
commercial law treaties.247 
Functional arguments founded on executive preeminence m 
foreign affairs thus do not mandate absolute judicial acquiescence to 
executive-branch interpretations of all treaties. Respect for the executive's 
important role in the conduct of foreign affairs will justify calibrated 
judicial deference to the reasonable interpretation of treaties with foreign-
affairs implications. It may also be appropriate to grant enhanced deference 
to executive interpretations where the treaty-lawmakers have entrusted the 
continuing administration of a treaty to a particular executive agency. But 
this respect for the reasonable views of the executive does not displace the 
core judicial responsibility to interpret treaties that create domestically en-
forceable rights, nor does it invalidate a properly circumscribed delegation 
of authority to the courts to develop the law within their scope. 
second is a private organization, The Hague Conference on Private International Law, which has 
focused primarily on conventions governing civil procedure and domestic relations. For examples of 
treaties drafted by this body that have been ratified by the United States, see supra notes 5-6 and 
accompanying text. The final institution, also private, is the International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law, commonly known by its French acronym, UNIDROIT. This body originally came into 
being as an entity affiliated with the League of Nations but is now an independent organization with 
headquarters in Rome. See International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Mar. 15, 1940, 15 
U.S.T. 2494 (entered into force for the United States on Mar. 13, 1964). Through special legislation in 
1963, Congress officially authorized U.S. participation in UNIDROIT. See 22 U.S.C. § 269g (2001). 
For more information on the work of these bodies, see Van Alstine, supra note 16, at 694-700. 
245. For a review of the Uniform Commercial Code drafting process referenced here, see A. 
Brook Oberby, Modeling U.C.C. Drafting, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 645, 652-56 (1996) (describing the 
drafting process for the revision of the Uniform Commercial Code); William J. Woodward, Jr., Private 
Legislation in the United States-How the Uniform Commercial Code Becomes Law, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 
451 ( 1999) (describing the work of the American Law Institute and the quasi-public National Council 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws). See also Paul B. Stephen, The Futility of Unification and 
Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 749-53 (1999) (describing 
the drafting process for international commercial law). 
246. See Peter H. Pfund, Contributing to Progressive Development of Private International 
Law: The International Process and the United States Approach, 249 RECUEIL DES CouRs 9, 51-75 
(1994) (describing the drafting process for a variety of private-law treaties and noting the involvement 
of the Office of the Legal Advisor for Private International Law of the State Department). 
247. See id. at 55-57 (relaying an observation by the principal State Department official involved 
in such projects that the drafting work required "specialized expertise [which is] available in the United 
States almost exclusively in the private legal and business sectors, in law schools, and in the interest 
groups representing the particular industry, branch of business or other activity"); see also Alejandro 
M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, 23 INT'L LAW 443, 484 n.9 (1989) (noting that the principal representatives of the 
United States in the drafting of the U.N. Sales Convention were Professors Alan Farnsworth and John 
Honnold, in addition to a representative of the State Department, Peter Pfund). 
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CONCLUSION 
The subject of the interpretation of treaties is sure to become an in-
creasingly contentious one. Just as the growth of statutes into this nation's 
"primary source of law"248 propelled statutory interpretation into one of the 
most animated themes of legal scholarship, so too does the rise of treaty 
law promise to spawn increasingly heated academic debate. One aspect of 
the treaty power that thus far has largely escaped scholarly and judicial 
attention is the authority of the treaty-lawmakers (the President, with the 
consent of the Senate) to delegate developmental powers to the federal 
courts. In this light, Professor Y oo' s call for more intense scrutiny of the 
constitutional foundation for such an authority is to be welcomed. I have 
argued here that, parallel to an established principle in the statutory con-
text, a deliberate and circumscribed delegation of authority to develop the 
law within the scope of a self-executing treaty fully comports with both the 
text and structure of the Constitution. Indeed, a whole range of private-law 
treaties, some ratified, others waiting to be, already expressly contain such 
a delegation. As this and other issues of treaty law continue to gain promi-
nence in our domestic legal system, this debate sounds a call to judges and 
scholars for substantially more analysis of the proper role of the judiciary 
in the interpretation of treaties as one part of "the supreme Law of the 
Land."249 
248. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 18, at 321. 
249. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
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